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EUROPE
OVERSEAS

WILLIAMSON

THE WORLD'S MANUALS




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An Italian World Map of 1351, forecasting the shape of Africa



SPANISH COLONIZATION. A German title-page, 1598

EUROPE OVERSEAS

BY

JAMES A. WILLIAMSON




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Chaucer's Merchant

I

The Outward Impetus

THE expansion of Europe is something more than the process by which certain European powers have planted colonies and acquired dependencies in other continents: for it concerns the appearance presented by the face of the whole world to-day. In countries like China and Japan, where Europeans have never borne rule, in others like India and Indo-China and the great Asiatic archipelago, where European rule is perhaps not fated to endure for ever, the impress of European manners, methods, and morals is firmly stamped. It accounts for much of their present aspect, and it can hardly be that it will not permanently modify their future life. Still more has expansion reacted upon Europe herself. Had it never taken place, we might be living to-day in rustic simplicity, knowing nothing of industrialism, rapid transport, and applied science in general. These things, although less tangible than the growth of coloured areas upon the map, are not less important in world-history. There may be less to be said about them in the pages which follow, but they should nevertheless be borne in mind as an ever-present background to the story of material colonization.

Of colonization itself some definition is necessary. The word means different things at different times and amongst different peoples. The modern Englishman thinks of it primarily as the transference of surplus population to new homes overseas in regions which luckily find themselves under his flag. For the central European the above process spells emigration to an alien flag in North America, and hardly appears as colonization at all. The same may be said of Spain and Italy, which send much of their surplus to the Argentine. For all these peoples, and for the Frenchman whose numbers never exceed the accommodation of his own land, the primary meaning of colonization is the acquisition of regions whose soil can produce useful materials and whose natives can render useful services, military or otherwise. And this aspect of colonization is of course not negligible in the ideas and policies of the British Empire. There are, then, at the present day, two chief kinds of colonial possession; and for them the French have invented two excellent descriptive terms, *colonies de peuplement* and *colonies d'exploitation*, for which our own language lacks a convenient parallel.

Before colonization came another form of expansion which only very gradually merged into it—the penetration of unknown lands and seas for purposes of commerce. That was indeed the germ and origin of the European domination of the world. It drew the mediaeval adventurer eastwards into contact with the Asiatics of the Levant and the Caucasus and the Russian-Tartar frontiers. The early commerce with Asia was in essence a search for new foodstuffs, drugs and spices, rare textiles, jewellery, luxuries of all kinds, for the amenities which stimulated an advance of civilization. Coupled with an active inter-European trade in the distribution of these articles and in the exchange of foods, wines, and clothing, it had an immense effect in developing the European mind and bringing into prominence those qualities which have made the European dominant over the other races of the world. Constant mutual intercourse produced in the classes which it

affected a more lively intelligence, an adaptability and freedom of judgment, and a higher standard of physical and moral stamina. It is even probable, indeed, that mediæval commerce increased the average duration of life by neutralizing local misfortunes from famines and war, and by favouring the survival of the cultured classes. The well-to-do Englishman of the fourteenth century, for example, was fed not merely upon the bread, mutton, and ale of his own soil. In the Lenten period of scarcity he ate herrings from the North Sea and stockfish from the Iceland coast; he seasoned his salt flesh and salt fish with spices from the Far East brought to Sandwich or Southampton by the galleys of Venice and the carracks of Genoa; he purified his blood with oranges and figs and dried fruits from Spain and the Mediterranean; at rare intervals even a cargo of sugar came by Venetian hands to an English port; and every sunny tract of Christendom produced its especial wine with which he washed down his repast. And so it was in other lands: each in its own fashion gave birth to an enterprising and managing caste before whose adventurous members in time to come the chiefs of the sedentary East and the barbarous South and West were to be but as helpless children. It is a superficial view which ascribes European supremacy to superior guns and mathematics. It was not that but an active courage unhampered by the deadweight of tradition which enabled a handful of Portuguese to seize every strategic point in the Indian Ocean in the space of twenty years, and a smaller handful of Spanish adventurers to overturn the empires of Mexico and Peru. To mediæval commerce, then, we must assign a great part in preparing the European for his modern destiny.

Nor must another motive-power be overlooked. On the southern and eastern borders of the Mediterranean Christianity was face to face with Islam, and in the Baltic lands with heathendom; and the Moslem had established himself even in the western corner of Europe itself. To clear Spain, to recover Northern Africa, and to free the Holy Places of Palestine was the motive

of centuries of crusading. The Crusades were less an attack than a counter-attack ; the soil for whose possession they were fought had all been part and parcel of the Christian empire of Rome in the fourth century. Before Islam had become all-powerful and had cut the communications, Christian missionaries had penetrated far and wide in Asia, and the tradition of an Asiatic Christian power, the Empire of Prester John, lingered on long after access to Asia had been closed. The hope of finding Prester John, of combining with him to crush the Turk between two fires, was as potent with the Portuguese discoverers as was that of opening up new trade-routes. When Vasco da Gama dropped anchor at Calicut a ' Moor ' shouted to the newcomers to ask what they sought : ' Christians and spices ', was their reply. In Africa also religion gave sanction to a practice for which the pioneers must have felt the need of justification, the kidnapping of negroes in masses to labour upon the fields of Portugal. The hardship to their bodies was held to be more than compensated by the salvation of their souls. The religious and the commercial motives worked together in the earliest stage of European expansion. Later, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, material interests gained decidedly the upper hand, and the pioneers who still left their native countries for spiritual reasons, such as the English Puritans, thought more of saving their own souls than the souls of coloured men. Then again in the nineteenth century the missionary interest revived, with important results in Africa and the Pacific.

Central and Western Europe form a peninsula in which there is scarcely a single point more than three hundred miles from a sea-coast, and in which natural harbours and navigable rivers abound. The sea and the rivers have therefore played a great part in the commerce of European nations one with another, for water-transport is usually cheaper than land-transport ; and two seas in particular acted in earlier times as feeders to two different networks of land-routes stretching eastwards to Asia. These were

the Baltic with its Gulfs of Finland and Riga, and the Eastern Mediterranean with its extension the Black Sea.

From the shores of the Baltic the Norsemen gained access to Russia, and set up the first coherent states in that expanse of barbarism. Their enterprises took them southwards down the river-ways to the Black Sea and Constantinople, and brought them into contact with merchants from the plains of Central Asia. The vikings were traders as well as warriors, and they formed the first connecting link between Western Europe and the colder regions of Asia. As the Norsemen declined after a brief phase of achievement a longer-lived organization arose to take their place. The seaports of northern Germany and the Baltic coasts grew rich by their position on the same natural route. By the fourteenth century they were fully confederated as the Hanseatic League, numbering in its prime a membership of no less than eighty cities and towns. Much of their prosperity came from the fisheries and from their services as carriers between the ports of other nations. But much also flowed from their regular trade in the mart-towns of Russia—centres such as Novgorod and Moscow, which they reached by land-routes from Narva, Riga, and Königsberg. At the Russian *dépôts* they collected the produce of that country and met also Asiatics who had brought their wares from Persia and from cities like Samarcand and Kashgar, which linked up in their turn with the wealth of China itself. This northern line of communication with Asia was more tedious and expensive to operate than the southern route through the Levant, but it was not so easily ruined by the Ottoman conquests, the cause which led first to the decay of the southern trading-system.

Just as the Hanseatic cities formed the middlemen and distributors upon the northern route to Asia, so the Italian merchant-states fulfilled a similar office upon the lines which converged through the bottle-neck of the Levant. There is, however, this difference to be noticed, that whereas the Germans banded

themselves into a league, a vast merchant-union, with a single navy and a joint administration and diplomatic service, the Italian cities remained ever upon terms of mutual rivalry. Ultimately Venice and Genoa, after forging ahead of all the rest, engaged in a duel for the supremacy from which Venice emerged victorious, only to see the prize wrenched from her hands in the next century by the conquering Turk.

Three main lines of trade, with a network of branches and cross-cuts, led from Asia into the Levant. The most northerly started from the inland parts of China, passed through Samarcand and Bokhara and the Oxus basin, skirted the northern shore of the Caspian, and came out at the Crimean ports of the Black Sea, whence the Italian merchants carried the goods to their own cities and distributed them over Western Europe. It was this route which the Hanseatic traders tapped from the north by means of the Russian waterways. To the southward of this system lay another, partly terrestrial, partly maritime. Arab seamen, whose voyages are typified in the stories of Sinbad the Sailor, fetched the produce of Southern Asia from the Malay Peninsula, from Ceylon, and from India, to their great port of Basra in the Persian Gulf. Thence the route ascended the Tigris and Euphrates, forking into three caravan lines reaching respectively the Black Sea (Trebizond and Sinope), the western end of Asia Minor (Smyrna, the Aegean Islands), and the knot of cities in Northern Syria (Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut), where also the Italians stood ready to complete the transit to Europe. The importance of Constantinople, both to the Black Sea and Asia Minor routes, will be realized from a glance at the map. Finally, the Arab navigators of the Indian Ocean were responsible for the greater part of another line of trade, almost wholly maritime. From the same Far Eastern regions, where they came into contact with Malays, Japanese, and Chinamen, they brought the richest merchandise of the world into the Red Sea, past its perilous shores to within a short stage of Cairo, and thence to Alexandria where

the ubiquitous Venetians awaited the prize. The vitality of these Levant routes is one of the most constant factors in the world's history. They are found in full operation at the dawn of recorded time. The Egypt of the Pharaohs, Tyre and Sidon of the Phoenicians, Solomon's Jerusalem, lived upon them and largely by them. They maintained some at least of their importance in



spite of Turkish conquests and the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope. And in our day the Suez Canal and the Bagdad Railway represent the application of industrial science to their ancient purposes.

The Venetians, as we have said, gained the greatest share of the Levantine trade. Trade was the first step towards colonization; and the Venetians were the first people of Europe to acquire overseas possessions under their own sovereignty which

they administered in a manner showing recognizable affinity with that of the colonial empires of the modern world. The earlier Norsemen had indeed made colonies over all the northern seas ; but in doing so they had not made an empire. They had simply branched into independent communities without a central authority, and the greatest of their establishments had within a few generations become merged with the foreign populations in whose midst they had been planted. Moreover, Norse expansion was not the expansion of Europe. It was rather the infusion of vigorous barbarian blood into the body of Europe, and so falls without the scope of our subject. The Venetians, on the other hand, acquired their possessions with a purpose and administered them with a policy. The details of their conquests are too involved to be narrated here, but for the purpose of an outline it may be said that they began with an alliance between the Venetians and the Crusaders in 1204. The confederates, instead of attacking the infidel, fell upon Constantinople, the capital of the decaying Eastern Empire of ancient Rome. They sacked the city with horrible brutality, and in the division of the spoils Venice received the Ionian Islands, many isles in the Aegean, and harbours upon the coasts of Greece and Albania, retaining also a controlling interest in Constantinople, the gate of the Black Sea. She had previously acquired islands and stations nearer home in Dalmatia on the eastern shore of the Adriatic. Genoa at this date was by no means reconciled to an inferior position, and before the end of the thirteenth century she inflicted severe naval defeats upon Venice and gained a footing of equality in Constantinople and the Black Sea. Thenceforward Venice concentrated her chief efforts upon the Aegean, Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt. There, by the latter half of the fifteenth century, when Turkish maritime power was becoming formidable, she had, in addition to the conquests mentioned above, a great *dépôt* for the spice trade at Alexandria, and the full sovereignty of the islands of Candia and Cyprus, from the latter of which she was able to reach out to the

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trading cities of Syria. She managed these possessions with an eye to the increase of her commercial wealth and maritime power, with discriminating customs dues and other restrictions upon foreigners' navigation, in the manner of the great oceanic powers of modern times.

The regular operations of the Eastern trade brought Europeans into contact with the fringe of Asia. They afforded also a base from which the more daring adventurers could push into the unknown and see for themselves the countries which produced the merchandise they valued so highly. In the thirteenth century far-seeing Popes had the idea of stirring up the Tartars to fall upon the Saracens from behind, and several friars were dispatched into Central Asia for this purpose. Of these the best known are John de Plano Carpini (1245-7) and William of Rubruck (1253-5), both of whom reached Mongolia. The greatest of all these explorers was Marco Polo the Venetian merchant, for he possessed the art to make his experiences live in an imperishable book. His father and uncle penetrated through the Crimea and Turkistan to the court of Kublai Khan in China and back to Venice on a journey which occupied the years 1260 to 1269. Setting out again in 1271, they took Marco Polo with them, reached Pekin in 1275, and resided in the Chinese Empire for seventeen years, employed in great affairs of state, and travelling in all directions. At length they completed their adventure by sailing from a Chinese port, voyaging by the Malay Straits and Ceylon to the Persian Gulf, and so home to Venice by the recognized caravan route in 1295. The Polos had seen more of Asia than had any other Europeans, and Marco described its wonders in a manuscript which was copied in all languages, read in all countries, printed in the fifteenth century, and adopted as a gospel by Columbus and the great maritime discoverers. The *Travels of Marco Polo* founded a school of literature. Other writers, like the charlatan Sir John Mandeville, published equally readable if less veracious narratives; and just at the time when shipping and navigation

and the resources of capital were becoming equal to the task the imagination of Christendom was fired to a determination to gain more effective contact with the wealth and wonders of the East.

The Venetian colonies had been bases for trade, comparable to the fortified factories of the English and French in India in the eighteenth century. The Portuguese at the other end of Europe were the first people to develop the colony of exploitation, and they found in the island groups of the Eastern Atlantic a suitable ground for the attempt. The story of the first discovery of these islands is wrapped in considerable obscurity. One group at least had been known to the geographers of antiquity under the name of the Fortunate Isles, but it had never come within the orbit of the Roman Empire. Modern discovery seems to date from the latter part of the thirteenth century, when Genoese and other Italians led out expeditions through the Straits of Gibraltar. In 1270 some Genoese discovered the Canaries, but the fact was forgotten, and when a Portuguese-Italian expedition reached the same group in 1341 they claimed it as a new discovery. In the same way the Azores were discovered in 1351 and re-discovered in 1431. Madeira is also said to have been visited by an Englishman from Bristol in 1370, but the story is dubious, and we do not reach firm ground until the Portuguese discovery in 1416.

It was not until the fifteenth century, in fact, that Portugal was ready to begin her career of expansion. It proceeded simultaneously in two directions, the occupation of the islands named above, and the discovery of the west coast of Africa down to the equator and ultimately to the Cape of Good Hope. In the islands the Portuguese formed plantations cut up into feudal estates, and cultivated the sugar-cane and the vine. Down the African coast they hunted for slaves, gold, and ivory, and made the populous Guinea region into a great black dependency. The name of Prince Henry the Navigator (1394-1460) is always associated with these achievements, and there has been a tendency to credit him with plans and policies which may never actually

have entered his mind. The motive for colonizing the islands needs little explanation: they were fair soil for the raising of desirable commodities. But the discovery of the African coast led ultimately to that of the sea-way to India, and it is tempting to believe that Prince Henry was a great prophetic genius who foreshadowed that result from the outset. His real objectives were less distant. He knew that the Moors of North Africa traded southwards across the Sahara with a region they called Bilad Ghana or Land of Wealth, inhabited by negroes and having a coast upon the ocean. He dispatched his expeditions (which he did not accompany in person) to find this coast, to bring back slaves to work upon the waste areas of Portugal, and to convert the swarming population to Christianity. Success would therefore mean the extension of the faith and the increase of the wealth of Portugal. A further but much more shadowy goal may also be attributed to him, that of reaching a Christian country (in fact Abyssinia) rumoured to exist at the sources of the Nile, and so to form a coalition against the Turk. Prince Henry at bottom was a crusader and not a profit-hunter, and if he paid expenses by kidnapping negroes he consoled his conscience by rescuing their souls from perdition. But in the process the Portuguese developed a very keen appreciation of the commercial value of discovery, and after his death the movement developed into a race for wealth and the exploitation of the East.

The revelation of the African coast was very slow at first, owing to the desolate nature of the shores down to the Senegal River and the superstitions of the mariners, who believed that devils and magicians haunted the unknown. Not until 1434 did a Portuguese captain pass south of Cape Bojador, and not until 1444 did another reach the Bay of Arguin, the beginning of the populous country of Guinea. In 1445 Diniz Diaz discovered Cape Verde, and in 1455-6 Ca da Mosto, an Italian in Portuguese service, reached Sierra Leone. When Prince Henry died in 1460 Cape Palmas at the beginning of the Ivory Coast marked the

approximate southward limit attained, whilst at sea the Cape Verde Islands had recently been explored. A quiet period of some ten years followed, and then in 1470-81 a fresh outburst of energy resulted in the mapping of the Ivory and Gold Coasts and the Bight of Benin as far as 2° south of the equator. The government farmed the trading rights to capitalists and built fortified stations for their support, the head-quarters of the whole region being established at S. Jorge da Mina (Elmina) in 1481. Not only thousands of slaves, but also quantities of ivory, gold dust, and tropical grains, poured into Lisbon as a result of this enterprise, and Portugal took rank as one of the leading nations in Europe.

From this point the new commercial scheme of a sea-passage from Europe to Asia began to take shape. Shipbuilders, ship-owners, and navigators had proved their capacity to provide for a voyage of any length if wayside victualling stations could be found. The western shore of Africa was known to the equator, and from Arab sources a fairly accurate outline had been obtained of its eastern coast to a much more southerly latitude, for the Arabs habitually traded as far down as the mouth of the Zambesi. To bridge the gap by rounding the southern extremity of the continent was now the task, and it was accomplished with comparative rapidity. In 1482-4 Diego Cam found the Congo and entered its mouth, and in 1485-7 he attained the latitude of 22° S. at Cape Cross. Then, in 1487-8 Bartholomew Diaz determined to solve the great problem. He pushed farther than ever before to the southward, lost sight of the land, turned eastward, then again northward, and sighted a coast running in a north-easterly direction. He followed it far enough to be certain that he had the Indian Ocean before him, and returned to Portugal with his news, discovering the Cape of Good Hope on the homeward passage. To reap the fruits of the discovery required a carefully planned and well-armed expedition, for the Arabs of the Indian Ocean were certain to be hostile. For various reasons this crowning voyage was delayed for nine years.

At length in 1497 Vasco da Gama sailed from Lisbon in command of four ships and 170 men. He rounded the Cape, obtained native pilots on the east coast of Africa, and anchored at Calicut in the south of India on May 21, 1498. With his return in the following year the period of discovery gave place for Portugal to the period of empire.

Meanwhile explorers had been leading Christendom to the West. All who believed that the world was a globe realized that a westward passage from Europe must lead, in the absence of a barrier, to the eastern coast of Asia. The ancients had expressed the idea in words, although not in action, and certain mediaeval records show that it had not been wholly forgotten. It remained for the men of the Renaissance to make the experiment. To encourage them there were two commonly received errors, an overestimate of the west-to-east length of Asia, and an underestimate of the circumference of the globe, which together induced the belief that the shores of Cathay must lie within a practicable distance—an optimist put it at 'a few days' sail'—from Europe.


Two navigators persistently preached this doctrine until they obtained from richer men the means of testing it: Christopher Columbus in Portugal and Spain, and John Cabot in England. Both were Genoese by birth, although Cabot became a naturalized Venetian. Both were poor and waited long for patronage, but so little is known about the early life of either that it cannot be said whether one copied the other, or whether they evolved their schemes independently. But it seems likely that the westward passage had become by this time a fairly widespread topic of discussion. There was certainly a belief, encouraged by the discovery of the Azores, that other Atlantic islands existed not far from Europe, and there are vague stories of unsuccessful voyages made in quest of them both from England and Portugal.

Columbus made the first clearly recorded attempt to solve the problem. After vainly soliciting aid from the Kings of Portugal and England he came to an agreement with Ferdinand and

Isabella of Spain. On August 3, 1492, he sailed from Palos with three caravels, bound for the discovery either of the mainland of Asia itself or, according to a more recent view, of a half-way land which would form a stepping-stone to the goal. The daring of the voyage lay in the fact that it was a push into open water without the certainty of refreshing places such as the Portuguese had always counted upon in their African coasting. Columbus went southward first to the Canary Islands and thence steadfastly westward in spite of murmuring crews until he landed, on 12 October 1492, upon the island of San Salvador in the Bahamas. Natives directed him southwards to the larger lands of Cuba and Hispaniola. He thought the former might be a part of the main continent, and in the spring of 1493 he returned with the assertion that he had found at least the archipelago described by Marco Polo as lying off the south-east of Asia. On his second expedition (1493-6) he passed through the chain of the Lesser Antilles, discovered some of its units together with Porto Rico and Jamaica, and stayed to organize Spanish settlements in Hispaniola. Sailing again in 1498 he coasted Trinidad and part of the main of South America which now lies within the borders of Venezuela. Finally, in 1503, he followed the shore of Central America from Honduras down to the Isthmus of Panama. Before that date other explorers, notably Alonzo de Ojeda and Amerigo Vespucci, had traced the greater part of the northern coast of South America, and some expedition whose record is now lost, but whose traces are found in early maps, had sighted the North American coast from Florida upwards.

John Cabot could not obtain the use of a ship until 1497. In that year he sailed in the *Matthew* from Bristol, discovered the Newfoundland fishery and some part of the main of North America, and returned also confident that he had reached the outlying parts of Cathay. In 1498 he went again with five ships to open up an oriental trade. The outcome of this voyage is a mystery, although it is obvious that the commercial object

could not have been attained. The evidence of maps, not altogether conclusive, suggests the belief that he traced a great part of the coastline of the present United States. Sebastian Cabot, his son, claimed in after years to have made a voyage far into the



north-west in search of a passage to Asia, from which he returned baffled by ice and mutinies.

The last-named enterprise arouses an interesting question in European expansion. When was it first realized that the western land was not Asia but an obstacle on the path to Asia? Among John Cabot's associates the belief that he had found Cathay can hardly have survived his voyage of 1498, if indeed it is true that he

then made a thorough examination of the new coasts. For the men of that day, students of Marco Polo, must have realized the contrast between Red Indians and Chinamen, between hut villages and the cities of Quinsay and Cambalu. Sebastian Cabot's quest of the North-West Passage presupposes a barrier to circumvent; but of that adventure the details are dim and not even the date is certain. Of Columbus again it is often said that to the day of his death in 1506 he never knew that he had found an unknown continent. Certainly he never admitted as much in plain terms, but he had the strongest reasons for silence whatever his convictions may have been. For to Spaniards and Englishmen alike America was no welcome discovery; it was a bitter frustration of their hopes of immediate gain, the more galling since Portugal was reaching the goal by her own favoured route. Hence the obscurity in surviving records of this important question. But from inference and side-winds it may be stated with fair confidence that America began to appear in her true light to some Europeans at least by the year 1500. What followed belongs to the story of her conquest and colonization.

2

The Expansion of Portugal and Spain

THE expansion of Europe into other continents may be viewed, down to the middle of the eighteenth century, as a competition between the five European nations whose position and political status fitted them to become oceanic powers. Portugal and Spain, the first in the field, staked out a world-wide claim, went some way towards making it a reality, and then sank into a static and defensive condition in which they yielded much of their claim and much even of their possession to their newer competitors. These were the English, the French, and the Dutch. The latter throve

principally by conquest from the Portuguese; the two former by the occupation of territories left vacant by the Spaniards; but all three were inevitably hostile to the world-claims of the first colonizing powers. The Reformation gave an added bitterness to the early stages of the struggle, for the English and Dutch were Protestants, and of France it has been justly said that whilst Catholic at home she was Protestant abroad. This stage lasts until the close of the Thirty Years War in 1648, which roughly coincides with the dying-out of the colonial contest between the two old and the three new powers. Thenceforward the three successful newcomers turned upon one another—English against Dutch in the late seventeenth century, English against French in the eighteenth, with the final result that the Treaty of Paris closing the Seven Years War in 1763 yielded Great Britain the supremacy of the oceans and the potential prospect of dominating the world. It was a burden which, perhaps fortunately for ourselves, she was unable to sustain, and the old British Empire fell to pieces by the independence of the United States twenty years after the day of its greatest triumph. After that catastrophe expansion begins again on new lines.

Such is the political aspect of the story; and from the economic standpoint also the mid-eighteenth century marks a culmination. Until that period the chief object of expansion was the increase of national power by the commercial exploitation of colonies, by occupying those regions which would yield either the precious metals themselves or valuable products which could be sold for them in the markets of the world; the *colonie de peuplement* was indeed founded, but it was an incident, almost an accident, and an embarrassing one to the commercial strategists of the time. Since the period above-mentioned the Industrial Revolution of Europe has shifted the balance of motives, and brought into prominence a new set of values which will fall to be considered in the later chapters of this book.

(i) The Portuguese Empire

In her African possessions Portugal achieved something less than Prince Henry desired at the outset. She claimed as her own the whole West African coast down to the Cape, and the East coast from thence to the entrance of the Red Sea, with of course the monopoly of penetrating the interior. The region to which she devoted most attention was the populous negro area of Upper Guinea, from the Senegal River to the Equator. This the Prince intended to make an apauage to the Order of Christ, a military and religious body framed upon crusading lines. He designed the formation of ecclesiastical units and feudal estates, leading to the rapid conversion and civilization of the whole region. But very little of this programme was carried out. Slave-raiding was the curse of all West Africa, and it increased to enormous dimensions with the opening-up of American plantations. A few chiefs became nominal Christians, called themselves Dom Joam or Dom Pedro, and professed to rule as vassals of the king; but the mass of the people remained unconverted and distrustful of the European. Slaving warfare rendered the interior unsafe for explorers, and the Portuguese seldom left the neighbourhood of the coast. There they held fortified stations where they received and shipped the slave gangs and such tributes of gold and ivory as they could collect from the tribes. The status of the trade was that of a royal monopoly, and its method of operation was by leases and licences for restricted times and areas to mercantile capitalists.

In Lower Guinea, south of the equator, the Portuguese did little until the colonization of Brazil gave rise to a demand for slaves from a source which could dispatch them by a quick voyage without the crossing of the equatorial belt of calms. In South Africa Portugal formed no settlements. The coast was dangerous and the natives hostile, and the shipping to and from the East avoided touching unless there was absolute necessity. East Africa

from the Mozambique Channel northwards looked upon the Indian Ocean. Moslem traders had occupied its available seaports, and the Portuguese took possession as soon as they were strong enough. Here again effective occupation of the interior was very restricted. The coasts of Africa were the only parts of it known to Europeans until quite modern times, and this was partly because the slave trade kept the interior in a ferment, and partly because the coast stations were regarded less as gates into the country than as halting-places on the road to the East. The latter consideration, as late as the beginning of the nineteenth century, was the only reason for the British acquisition of the Cape.

Before turning to the Portuguese doings in America it is necessary to explain their title of entry there. After the return of Columbus in 1493 with tidings of a field of discovery for Spain in the West it seemed as though both the peninsular powers would shortly be trading in the same region, the extreme east of Asia. They applied to the Pope, Alexander VI, for a ruling to prevent disputes, and he issued bulls conferring upon Spain the right to make discoveries west of a meridian passing down the North Atlantic, and upon Portugal a similar right east of that line. In other words, either power was free to expand round the world, but they were to proceed in opposite directions. Subsequently, by the Treaty of Tordesillas, 1494, the two powers agreed upon a meridian 370 leagues west of the Azores as the dividing line between them. The question of the rights of other nations to expansion had not at this date arisen, and so it is hardly correct to say that the Pope arbitrarily excluded all but Spain and Portugal from the ocean. The arrogance of the proceeding lay not in the papal decision but in the interpretation afterwards placed upon it, whereby the newer claims of England, France, and Holland were treated as invalid from the outset, and the monstrous notion was propounded and acted upon that the crowns of Spain and Portugal had a prescriptive right to lands which their subjects had not occupied, and perhaps had never seen.

The line of demarcation fixed at Tordesillas is approximately the meridian passing through the southern point of Greenland. But there was at that date no method, other than dead reckoning, of calculating longitude, and so huge errors were frequent. When Cabot discovered the Newfoundland fishery and the adjoining coasts Portugal conceived them to lie within her sphere (although actually they do not) and dispatched two explorers, Gaspar and Miguel Corte Real, to see what the find was worth. The Corte Reals both perished in the North-West, in 1501 and 1502 respectively, and Portugal relinquished her territorial claim, although her mariners long frequented the fishery. More substantial was the application of the 1494 agreement to Brazil. In 1499-1500 Vincent Pinzon, with the writer Amerigo Vespucci as his passenger, followed the northern coast of that country westwards into the Caribbean. Three months after he had sighted it a Portuguese expedition bound for the East touched Brazil in the neighbourhood of Bahia, and its commander, Pedro Alvarez Cabral, claimed the land for Portugal. In this case the estimation of longitude was more correct, and the claim was undisputed. Beyond mapping the coast the Portuguese did nothing with Brazil for thirty years. Then, in 1531, they commenced colonization, parcelling out the coasts and river-courses into hereditary fiefs, and introducing a certain number of settlers, genuine colonists, who thrived by the cultivation of sugar and the collection of dyestuffs and other trade goods. In 1549 the colony was placed under a governor-general with his seat at Bahia. Brazil was a true colony like those in the Atlantic islands, but its expansion was very slow. The Portuguese never penetrated far from navigable water, and even their occupation of the northern coast westwards to the mouth of the Amazon was not complete until 1615. At that date they founded the city of Pará and began gradually to make their way into the delta of the great river.

So far we have considered the less important units of Portugal's empire. It was in the East that her greatest efforts were made


and her most brilliant successes achieved. Vasco da Gama, returning to Lisbon in 1499, reported that Calicut and other places on the Malabar Coast, ruled by independent princes, formed a *dépôt* for the spice trade at which the Moslems met and bartered with the merchants of the Far East. But the whole of the spice trade did not follow this course; a fair proportion of the exchange took place at Malacca, and Moslem merchants were even found residing in the islands themselves and in the cities of the Chinese coast. The object of the Portuguese was to master the whole of this trading system and divert its produce to the Cape route to Europe.

From 1500 numerous commanders were dispatched, with armed ships and hundreds of men. They gained first a grip upon the Malabar Coast, occupying Cochin and Cananor, although Calicut for a time held out against them. Francisco de Almeida, the first Viceroy, captured the Arab posts in East Africa, and was killed by Hottentots at the Cape on his homeward voyage. His successor, Afonso de Albuquerque, worked upon a comprehensive scheme. The Moslems, realizing their danger, had gathered a great naval force upon the Malabar coast, and the Portuguese had defeated it in battles against terrific odds. Albuquerque then (1510) chose Goa as the head-quarters in this region, and occupied and fortified it without delay. Having mastered one emporium of the spice trade he fell upon the other, sailing eastwards to Malacca and capturing it in 1511. This conquest opened the gate into the China Seas; the first Portuguese ship reached Canton in 1516. But Arab shipping still sailed the Indian Ocean, and in that vast area it was not easy for a few Portuguese sail to control its operations. Albuquerque therefore sought to close the home ports of the Moslems by seizing the entrances to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. At Aden he failed, withdrawing after a fruitless siege, but at Ormuz, an island in the narrows of the Persian Gulf, he succeeded, and the stronghold passed under the Portuguese flag.

Albuquerque died in harness in 1515, having drawn a bold

outline for his successors to elaborate. After his death the occupation of Bombay completed the Portuguese hold upon the trade of western India, Ceylon was taken, and Portuguese officers appeared everywhere in the archipelago of south-eastern Asia, where the Moluccas, the true Spice Islands, yielded the richest ladings in the world.

It was a dazzling heritage to fall to so small a nation, and in the end it proved a fatal one ; for the drain upon man-power was too



great to be borne. For every adventurer who came home rich to Portugal half a dozen left their bones in the East, and apart from all fighting and misadventures the long voyages round the Cape exacted a terrible toll of lives, as the records of pestilence in the slow-sailing carracks sufficiently prove. The Portuguese never felt easy about their power to hold what they had won, and the efforts of their Jesuit missionaries brought little success in converting Asiatics to European ways of thought. They were therefore driven to adopt a policy of terrorism to mask their lack of real strength. In India they dealt harshly with native rulers, whilst in the islands the intense hatred they incurred raised up

ready-made allies for the English and Dutch when those intruders made their appearance. At Goa and in Ceylon there was some attempt to plant true Portuguese colonists with their wives and children, but the stock soon deteriorated, although it has never become extinct to the present day. After the first flush of victory there followed throughout the Eastern seas a decline of enthusiasm, energy, and strength; and this decline was equally marked in Portugal itself. A deadly blow from which the Eastern dominions never recovered was the seizure of the Portuguese crown by Philip II of Spain in 1580. The Spanish administration did not understand the oriental possessions, and apparently cared little for their fate. The way was thus cleared for the easy triumph of the Protestant intruders who began to invade the Far East at the close of the sixteenth century.

(ii) *The Spanish Empire*

The Spanish empire of the new world falls into three well-marked divisions: the West Indian islands, the original discovery of Columbus; Mexico and Central America; and, greatest of all, South America with the exception of Guiana and Brazil. The colonization of the Greater Antilles began in 1493, that of Mexico in 1519, and that of Peru in 1532, the exploitation in each case being contemporaneous with, or but slightly in arrear of, the discovery.

The Portuguese in the Indian Ocean were, in a sense, finding new countries, but they were countries long known to Europeans by repute, their peoples and products to some extent familiar, and the conditions sufficiently understood for the government to be able to lay down a policy in advance. The Spaniards in the West, on the other hand, were revealing the unknown, and this forms some excuse for the failure of their government to control the more brutal instincts of the pioneers, whereby the natives suffered terrible wrongs. But it must be counted as a virtue to the Spanish sovereigns, and particularly to the Emperor Charles V,

that when the evil deeds of the *conquistadores* were realized, a determined attempt was made to grapple with the problem, and a theoretically sound and just system of colonization was set up. In intention, and to a less extent in practice, the Spanish administration was humane, and was certainly on a higher plane than that of Portugal, where cruel excesses were a calculated effect of policy.

Columbus planted a settlement in Hispaniola in 1493, and found on his return from Spain a few months later that the Indians had destroyed it. He began again, more successfully, at Isabella on the northern coast, but this settlement was ultimately abandoned, and San Domingo, on the south side, became the capital of the colony. The first object of the early Spanish pioneers was to collect gold, and their method was to compel every native to bring in a fixed quantity at stated intervals, receiving in return a brass token to be suspended from the neck. As the recent history of the rubber trade has shown, this method is subject to horrible abuses, and in this early instance it broke down owing to the fact that the Antilles produced only trifling supplies of gold, that first found in native hands being the accumulation of a long period of mining. Cotton was collected in the early years in the same manner, and the sugar-cane was introduced from the Canary Islands. But the Spaniards were always poor planters, indolent and thriftless, their minds ever preoccupied with gold; and they ended by abandoning to nature the whole western end of Hispaniola, which Frenchmen in after days made the richest sugar-colony in the world. Ultimately they found a use for the islands in the breeding of herds of wild cattle from animals brought from Europe, and the killing of them for their hides and tallow.

These remarks apply to Cuba and Jamaica in addition to Hispaniola, and to a less extent to the fourth large island, Porto Rico. In the Lesser Antilles, inhabited by the fierce Caribs, the Spaniards never colonized at all, a piece of neglect which left



Spaniards extorting treasure from an Indian chief (*Narratio Regionum Indicarum*, 1598 ed. De Bry)

vacant for their subsequent rivals the whole windward rim of the Caribbean Sea.

The natives of Hispaniola and Cuba were of more gentle manners than the Caribs, although belonging to the same racial stock. They sought at first to placate the intruders by supplying their wants, but were soon driven to rebellion by exorbitant demands. Many perished in massacre, and many were shipped as slaves to Spain. Queen Isabella gave orders for the liberation of some of these, although she allowed the enslavement of those taken in arms. The general policy of the government was to preserve the Indians in a state of tribute-paying vassalage, but not of slavery. It could not, however, enforce its will upon the pioneers, and in the space of a generation the natives of Hispaniola became extinct under hard usage. The coasts of the American mainland now appeared as a recruiting-ground, the only use to which they were put for five-and-twenty years after the first discovery. But no American Indians made satisfactory slaves, and the ultimate solution of the labour problem was found in bringing over negroes from Africa. Spain, having no hold in Guinea, gave to Portugal the *Asiento* or contract for negroes, the numbers and prices being strictly regulated. Las Casas, the first Bishop appointed to the new colonies, suggested the importation of negroes in order to save the remnant of the unhappy Indians, but afterwards he regretted his advice as only productive of fresh misery.

The poor results obtained by the Spaniards in the West Indies rendered them little disposed to push their activities on the mainland. There was a surplus neither of money nor of men for further exploitation. A few struggling posts sprang up on the Spanish Main, the modern coast of Colombia and Venezuela; and in 1513 an adventurer named Balboa crossed the Isthmus of Panama and beheld the Pacific Ocean bathing its southern side. But in general nothing of importance was hoped from America when once its fraudulent claim to be Cathay had been

exposed. In 1518, however, the matter suddenly took on a new aspect. A vessel dispatched into the Gulf of Mexico returned with news of a more civilized native race, owning the sway of an emperor in the interior, and having large stocks of gold in its possession.

At once the tidings excited all the restless and disappointed colonists of Cuba, and one Hernan Cortes, noted for his energy and valour, obtained the command of an expedition for the conquest of these wealthy people of Mexico. He sailed in 1519 with about 500 men, landed at Vera Cruz, destroyed his ships to preclude all thought of retreat, and marched towards the uplands where the golden city was reported to lie in an encircling lake. His prospects were favoured by the fact that the outlying tribes were in a state of bondage to those of the interior, and consequently welcomed him as a deliverer. With his passage thus facilitated, Cortes entered the city, seized the person of the vacillating Montezuma, the Emperor, and took over the government in the name of the King of Spain. Although Montezuma was paralysed as if by a premonition of fate, his subjects were less submissive. They gathered in force, showed greater fighting power than had been expected, and drove the Spaniards from the city with heavy casualties. Cortes retreated to the country of his native allies, and began again. By the close of 1521 Mexico was at his feet from ocean to ocean, and the shipment of enormous accumulated stocks of gold to Spain began. After this great hoard had been dispersed the annual output from the Mexican mines continued at a much more sober rate.

What Cortes had done in Mexico, Francisco Pizarro did in Peru. For some years rumours were current of a second wealthy empire to the southward, and in 1532 Pizarro sailed down from Panama and landed on the Peruvian coast. With him went less than two hundred men, to the conquest of a people who were themselves conquerors of all the neighbouring tribes, who had stately buildings, an organized administration, and hundreds

of miles of well-kept highroads. Never perhaps was seen in more violent relief the contrast between the type of character and mentality produced by a non-European civilization and by the European life of the Renaissance. The Incas of Peru could suffer with patient dignity, but in face of novel methods of aggression they could scarcely lift a finger in self-defence. Pizarro and his ruffians—they were indeed some of the vilest scoundrels of whom history bears record—overturned the Peruvian empire at the first rush, and then engaged in a seven years' bout of anarchy. The sight of gold maddened them. They slew and destroyed in sheer wantonness, quarrelled amongst themselves, murdered their leader, and fought a pitched battle with a force sent from Spain to restore sanity and order. Yet with all this they riveted their hold upon a country peopled by several millions of Indians.

A third treasure-state, the city of Manoa, ruled by El Dorado, the gilded chief, was said to lie in central South America. Rumour placed it sometimes here, sometimes there, on the Amazon, on the Orinoco, although in fact it existed nowhere. The search for it continued far into the seventeenth century, having for its only result a considerable advance in geographical knowledge of the interior. But a third conquest, although not an immediately wealthy one, did take place, that of New Granada, in the northern Andean region. The north coast of South America was also gradually settled from Panama to Trinidad, the foundations of Cartagena, its principal city, being laid in 1532. This coast was the Tierra Firme, known to the English as the Spanish Main.

The Spanish empire in America was now outlined, and apart from the islands it fell into two great units—Central America and South America—for Mexico failed to extend northward to the Mississippi and Florida in any effective manner, although the Spanish flag was flown in after years over the last-named peninsula, a colony almost devoid of colonists. Peru, on the other hand, did extend its sway southward into Chili and thence eastward over

the Andes into the basin of the River Plate. Organization therefore followed these natural divisions. The city of Mexico became



the head-quarters of the Viceroy of New Spain, whose jurisdiction extended southwards over Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, but not over the Isthmus. To this viceroy was also attached

nominal authority over the Antilles, but their governors commonly dealt with the home government direct. All the rest fell under the rule of the Viceroy of Peru, with his seat at Lima, well placed for governing the Main, Panama, and the southern provinces, but somewhat remote from Madrid and Seville. In practice, therefore, the officials of the Main governorships also corresponded direct with the home authorities.

English colonization, when it began in the following century, proceeded on the assumption of national identity between the colonists and their fellow-subjects at home. The emigrant was deemed to bear with him, not only his full duty of allegiance to the Crown, but also the Englishman's indefeasible rights of being governed according to the laws and political usages of England. Spain from the outset regarded the matter differently. The emphasis was placed upon the sovereignty of the Crown, and not upon the status of its subjects. The King was the monarch of Spain and also, as quite a separate matter, of the Indies, without any necessity for an identical organization in both realms. Hence the elaboration of Spanish colonial governance and the ordering of society could take place upon a clean sheet and in accordance with local requirements. The mould it actually took was a modification of the feudal one which was falling into disuse in Europe. This was necessitated by the comparative density and capacity for civilization of the Indian population in Central and South America. In the North American regions colonized by Englishmen the Indians were of slight importance and their political interests were ignored.

In New Spain, where the Spanish system was seen at its best, it worked in the following manner. Each newly subdued region was divided into estates called *encomiendas*, whose proprietors were responsible for maintaining order, instructing and civilizing the natives, and organizing them for civil and military duties. The owner of the *encomienda* derived his income from tribute levied upon his vassals; and, for the national good, he was obliged to

maintain a house in the town which formed the social and military centre of the group of estates. The good or evil results of this method of expansion depended enormously upon the general tone of the colonial society, and here the Church played its part as an influence upon the right side. Everywhere provision was made for due revenues to be expended on missionary work and for the endowment of permanent sees and benefices. The statesmanship of Cortes had a good effect in Mexico; the period of conquest and violence was curtailed; and when the first Viceroy, Antonio de Mendoza, took office in 1535 he was able to proceed at once with the work of settlement and amelioration. In 1542 Charles V promulgated the New Laws, designed to safeguard the rights of the natives, and they secured fuller application in Mexico than in the south. The result was that the Indians of the country, although still a subject race, were saved from being a servile one; and they were happier than under the bloodthirsty régime which Cortes had overthrown. To-day they survive as the major element in the Mexican people—no great triumph of European civilization, but yet creditable in comparison with what happened elsewhere.

In Peru and its dependencies the shadow of its less reputable conquerors long persisted. The period of violence and anarchy extended well into the latter part of the century. The best mines were in remote mountainous places, difficult of control: and the Indians were of softer mould, less able to survive hardship. The laws for their protection thus remained a dead letter, and under various devices slavery long continued in all but the name. But in Peru at last the tide turned, and Spaniards and Indians settled down in a relation tolerable to both and reflecting a modicum of credit upon Spanish administration.

Until 1550 emigration from Spain was not extensive. At that date there were reckoned to be only 15,000 pure-blooded Spaniards in the New World. Afterwards a greater movement set in, and by 1575 the number exceeded 150,000. Spaniards, like all the Latin races, had little sense of colour-repugnance, and mixed

marriages were frequent, producing *mestizos* (Spanish and Indian) and *mulatos* (Spanish and negro) in all their gradations. From Indians and negroes sprang another mixed breed, present under various names in most of the tropical colonies of the West.

Spain adopted an exclusive mercantile policy for her colonies, more with a view to excluding Protestant heresy than to benefiting the Spanish merchant at the expense of the settler. All the colonies were strictly forbidden to trade with foreigners or to admit them to their ports. This applied to foreigners sailing under their own flags; but individual aliens, even Germans and Englishmen, commonly penetrated all parts of the Spanish empire so long as they gave no offence on religious grounds. At the European end the colonial trade was limited to the port of Seville, and afterwards, when ships grew too large to ascend the river, to Cadiz. At the former place the *Casa de Contratacion* managed mercantile affairs, whilst the Council of the Indies was responsible for political administration. Its methods were detailed, centralized, and bureaucratic, in spite of the difficulties of time and space which always blunted their efficiency and often nullified their whole effect.

An enterprise not directly touching the colonization of America was the great voyage of Ferdinand Magellan in 1519-22. Magellan was a Portuguese captain in command of a Spanish expedition. His object was to find the western route to Asia which Columbus and Cabot had failed to reveal. He sailed far down the coast of South America until he discovered the straits which bear his name. Passing through them, he crossed the Pacific and reached the Asiatic archipelago, where he fell in battle with a native tribe. The survivors of his crews reached home by rounding the Cape of Good Hope. A permanent result of the voyage was the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by Spain; but the Straits of Magellan proved too dangerous for regular use, and the ordinary communication with the Philippines passed over the Isthmus of Panama.

*The English, French, and Dutch become
Oceanic Powers*

AT the close of the fifteenth century, when Portugal and Spain began their great advances to East and West, two other European peoples had reached a stage in their development which fitted them to take part in the same movement. The English and the French had both become nations in the modern sense, each with a homogeneous speech and law, an effective central government, and a patriotic consciousness of nationality as against other states. This result, which the Moorish crusades had achieved for Spain and Portugal, flowed in England and France very largely from their prolonged mediæval contests with one another. Ere the sixteenth century had half elapsed the Reformation supervened, to confirm the strength of nationality in England, to inflict upon it a merely temporary check in France. And before the close of that decisive epoch the same force gave birth to yet another nation, patriotic, maritime, and ambitious, in the seven Dutch provinces which revolted from Spain and proclaimed themselves the United Netherlands in 1579. In the hundred years which followed the Bull of Alexander VI these three new powers all began to feel their way towards oceanic expansion and to challenge the interpretation placed by Spain and Portugal upon that famous instrument.

England, for quite intelligible reasons, was at first slow to follow up the discoveries of John Cabot. She realized that his New Land was a bar to the oriental passage; and its own shores were unattractive and bordered by no such pleasant islands as Columbus had found in the south. She saw nothing useful there but the Newfoundland fishery, and that she exploited by the mariners of Bristol and the West Country from the early years of its discovery. Nevertheless a possibility remained to tempt the speculator, that of finding the Asiatic passage through or round

the forbidding American coast. Bristol men made voyages with this object in 1501-5, and Henry VIII dispatched a certain John Rut with two ships in 1527, incited thereto by the *Declaration of the Indies* written by Robert Thorne, a Bristol merchant doing business at Seville and fired by the information he collected there. Rut, in common with the others, failed ; but he sailed down the American coast and came home through the West Indies, the first Englishman recorded as trading and fighting in those islands. In North America for its own sake England showed little interest ; an empty continent was of no use to a country which had no emigrants with which to people it, and England had as yet no surplus population.

France also made a reconnaissance of North America, with the same immediate result. Giovanni da Verrazzano, a Florentine commissioned by Francis I, followed the whole coastline, and his master proclaimed annexation in 1524. The claim remained purely nominal. More practical in its effect was Verrazzano's capture of the first treasure-ship sent home by Cortes from Mexico, an act for which the Spaniards hanged the Italian when he afterwards fell into their hands. Jacques Cartier, a Breton of St. Malo, made a thorough exploration of the Gulf of St. Lawrence in 1534 and the subsequent years. Its attraction was the possibility of a passage, and when that failed the fur trade seemed to offer a chance of profit. The Sieur de Roberval planted a small post on the St. Lawrence in 1542, but it was soon abandoned for lack of support.

In two other directions Frenchmen and Englishmen made attempts at oceanic expansion in the middle of the sixteenth century. In 1530 Brazil, hardly yet touched by the Portuguese, offered a profitable trade in dyewoods and other tropical produce. William Hawkins of Plymouth trafficked there in that year, and maintained a lively business for some time afterwards. Other Englishmen did the same, and in 1542 the merchants of Southampton built a fort at some unknown point on the Brazilian coast.

The French king encouraged his subjects to follow their example, in spite of Portuguese protests, and the trade promised to grow important. But Portugal took seriously in hand the colonization of her neglected property, and the Anglo-French effort died out. A few years later, in 1553, a Portuguese renegade revealed the secrets of the Guinea coast to a syndicate of London merchants. They dispatched Thomas Wyndham with two ships. He died of



Robert Thorne's Map of the North Atlantic, 1527
(From Hakluyt's *Divers Voyages*)

fever with the greater part of his men, but the survivors brought home a rich lading of gold dust and ivory. Other adventurers followed his trail, and for the next dozen years a number of English ships were continually trading on the Gold Coast with the vassals of Portugal. Here again Frenchmen from Dieppe and Rouen followed suit, and there are records of lively naval actions between the intruders and the armed vessels sent out by Portugal to defend her monopoly. Ultimately this trade also ceased to be attractive, for the interlopers swept the coast clean of the small

supplies of treasure available, whilst the Portuguese became increasingly skilful in defensive measures. So far as England was concerned these breaches of the world-monopoly were a true national movement, since from 1554 to 1558 the foreign policy of the country was under the influence of Philip of Spain, husband of Queen Mary, and yet the government, in spite of its efforts, was unable to stop the Guinea voyages.

Sir John Hawkins, son of William Hawkins, was responsible for a daring extension of the enterprise described above. It was no less than an attempt to wrest from Portugal the monopoly of supplying negroes to the Spanish colonies in the West. Hawkins relied upon the fact that the Portuguese concessionaires and the Spanish officials combined to limit the supply and enhance the price of the slaves, to the detriment of the Spanish planter. In 1562-3 he sailed to Guinea, obtained a complement of negroes, crossed over to the Antilles, and sold them there at a handsome profit, lading his ships with West Indian hides in return. He claimed that his action was perfectly legitimate since old-standing commercial treaties, made before the age of discovery, had the effect of throwing open to English traders all seaports within the dominions of Philip II. Spain of course dissented from this view, holding that the New World was outside the scope of the treaties. Hawkins nevertheless repeated his adventure, changing his destination to the Spanish Main and the Gulf of Mexico, and overcoming by a display of force the half-hearted resistance of the local governors, who were secretly in sympathy with the free-trading planters. On his third voyage he was unlucky. Towards the close of 1568 he put in to refit at San Juan de Ulua, the port of Mexico. There he was suddenly attacked and his squadron destroyed by the annual treasure-fleet just arrived from Europe. However justifiable this action may have been on a broad view of Spanish rights, it was locally an act of treachery, for the Spanish commander had agreed to a mutual abstention from hostilities, and so took the English unawares. Hawkins and his kinsman

Francis Drake barely escaped with two small ships of their fleet of six.

The action of San Juan gave rise to a war of reprisals between England and Spain, in which Portugal became included after the seizure of her throne by Philip II in 1580. But already the French privateers had been active in the West Indies for nearly half a century. Their operations arose out of the wars between Charles V and Francis I, which endured with short intermissions from 1521 until peace was concluded by their successors in 1559. Even after that peace the depredations continued, for the French wars of religion set in, and the Huguenot adventurers took to the ocean and counted it a good work to plunder the dominions of the Catholic King. The French menace had already compelled Spain to concentrate her colonial trade in two great annual convoys, individual sailings being forbidden. One of these convoys went by way of the Antilles to San Juan de Ulua to pick up the Mexican treasure. The other called at Cartagena on the Main, and then went on to Nombre de Dios (afterwards moved to Porto Bello) on the Isthmus of Panama. There it received the Peruvian treasure, brought up in local shipping to Panama and carried on mule-back across the Isthmus. So jealously did Spain limit the trade of South America to the bottle-neck of Panama that she closed the port of Buenos Ayres on the River Plate. The settlers in that region were not allowed to ship direct to Spain, but had to carry on all communication by crossing the Andes to Peru, and so up the west coast. The limitations of this convoy system strangled the legitimate commerce of the Spanish empire, and gave rise to a vast system of contraband trade which sapped the moral of officials and colonists alike.

The protagonist of the English war of reprisals was Sir Francis Drake. Only a summary of his proceedings can be given here, but they may be generalized as a series of attacks upon the Peruvian treasure-route. In 1570 and 1571 he reconnoitred the Isthmus of Panama from its northern side. In 1572-3 he landed, attacked

Nombre de Dios, and afterwards captured a treasure-train on its way across the isthmus. In 1577-80 he passed the Straits of Magellan, sailed up the west coast, and struck the route in its Pacific section, taking a rich treasure-ship on its way from Peru to Panama. Then he sailed home westwards round the world. In these enterprises he found a number of imitators who followed his lead with varying success.

War with Spain became formal in 1585. Drake now commanded the Queen's fleets. He raided Hispaniola and Cartagena in 1585-6, took part in the defence against the Armada in 1587-8, led an unsuccessful counter-attack against Lisbon in 1589, and died in the Caribbean in 1596 in an attempt to repeat the achievement of ten years before. During the war English privateering became a regular business, financed by merchants like Alderman John Watts of London, and organized to yield a steady dividend. Other English enterprises upon the ocean were active during this period, and will be considered in the following chapter.

With the reign of Philip II (1555-98) began the revolt of the Dutch Netherlands against their Spanish masters. For many desperate years the outlook of the rebels upon land was black and, like the Huguenots, they indemnified themselves upon the sea. From plundering under letters of marque in the narrow waters of Europe they proceeded to oceanic raids in the Atlantic and the Caribbean. Dutch ships often played a part in the great English naval expeditions of the Elizabethan war. Towards the close of the sixteenth century, when privateering was becoming overdone and ceasing to be profitable, Dutch merchantmen began to trade at Trinidad and along the Spanish Main, where great supplies of salt were obtainable and tobacco was coming to the fore as a valuable article of commerce. Between Trinidad and Brazil lay the unconquered stretch of the Guiana coast, and here also the Dutch traded, formed connexions with the Indian tribes, and laid the foundation of a series of river-colonies. But their greatest outward advance was towards the spice-trade of the Far East, an achievement which we have next to describe.

The English, French, and Dutch in the East


ENGLAND was the first of the intruding powers to push for a trade-route of her own with the East ; and during the greater part of the sixteenth century she did so by attempting to find a northern passage to Asia so as to avoid trespassing upon the Portuguese route by the Cape of Good Hope. This was the object of the early north-western expeditions already referred to, and the riches of China and her neighbours were the principal theme of Thorne's *Declaration of the Indies*. But the early voyages gave little hope of a passage by the North-West, and so in 1553 the search took a different direction for the attainment of the goal. In that year Sir Hugh Willoughby sailed, with letters of recommendation to oriental potentates, to open a passage by the North-East. He himself perished in Lapland, but his subordinate, Richard Chancellor, entered the White Sea, reached Archangel, and travelled overland to Moscow, the first Englishman to make his appearance in that city. Chancellor came home in 1554 with a grant of trading privileges from the Tsar. He had not found the way to China, but he had found something of substantial importance ; and the corporation which had sent him out devoted itself to exploiting the new trade under the name of the Muscovy Company. Ultimately the Company's factors, under the leadership of Anthony Jenkinson, did succeed in opening up a trade with Persia by way of the Volga and the Caspian Sea. But anarchy in Central Asia prevented them from extending eastwards along the old mediaeval track of Marco Polo, and wars between Turks and Persians forced them to abandon the Caspian route after 1580. Thus ended the first serious move of the English towards the East. It had been made in a mistaken and difficult direction, for the world-routes of modern times were to follow the sea and not the land.

Just when the Muscovy Company failed in its Persian trade

another English corporation attacked the problem by a different approach. The Levant Company, chartered by Elizabeth, obtained permission from the Sultan to trade in the Turkish dominions. It established itself at Constantinople and afterwards at Aleppo, and by that means operated the route which had

been monopolized by the Venetians in their prime. The Levant Company survived into the nineteenth century, but it never did more than an indirect trade with further Asia. The Portuguese discoveries had proved the superior efficiency of the sea passage, and Englishmen became more and more convinced that they must have a sea passage of their own.

Already under Elizabeth the search for the North-West Passage had revived. Sir Martin Frobisher made three voyages in 1576-8 in the service of a body called



The English East India House, Leadenhall Street, 17th century

the Cathay Company. He announced that he had found a passage through what we now know as Baffin Land, but the Company became bankrupt before he could follow up his discovery to its inevitable failure. Again in 1585-7 John Davis made three attempts. He also claimed to have found an opening through the broad strait, named after him, between Baffin Land and Greenland. Actually his strait led to nothing but the polar ice, but lack of funds forced him to discontinue before he realized the futility of his hopes.

The attempts above described were the work of the peaceful school in London, who hoped to expand by some exclusive route which would avoid collision with Spain and Portugal. In 1585 came war with Spain and her vassal, and the necessity for considering the enemy's feelings disappeared. From this point Englishmen turned their thoughts to the only practicable way



The Dutch East India House, Amsterdam, 17th century

of sailing to the East, round the Cape of Good Hope. The capture in 1589 of a homeward-bound Portuguese carrack at the Azores revealed the well-nigh incredible profits of the trade. She was the richest prize until that time brought into an English port. Sir James Lancaster made a preliminary voyage by the Cape route in 1591-4, and although his crews were almost exterminated by sickness he had shown the way. Shortly after his return Jan van Linschoten, a Dutchman who had lived six years at Goa, published a book revealing the rottenness and decay of the

Portuguese hold upon their empire. Thenceforward Dutch and English merchants engaged in a race for the prize.

The Dutchmen sent out Cornelius Houtman in 1595. He traded and fought in the East and came back with an encouraging account. Several Dutch companies took up the work, their factors exploring the Spice Islands with varying success. Benjamin Wood sailed with an English squadron for China in 1596, but of his fate no trustworthy account ever came to hand, and not one of his men returned. The London merchants then determined to pool their resources in one great company. Political considerations caused delay, but at length they obtained their charter from the Queen on the last day of the sixteenth century, and the London East India Company began its career. Ere its first expedition had returned three things of cardinal importance had happened. Elizabeth had died in 1603, and the Tudor period had given place to the Stuart; war had ceased with Spain; and the Dutch concerns had all amalgamated into one great body, the Dutch East India Company receiving its charter from the States in 1602.

The goal of both English and Dutch was not primarily India, but the Spice Islands. Their methods and organization differed greatly, owing to difference of circumstance at home. The English company was an association of London merchants, exclusive of those of other ports, and relying upon a charter which the Crown had power to revoke and which it had no overwhelming interest to maintain. The company was therefore subject to the jealousy of other Englishmen, and was often bitterly assailed by them, especially at a time when the agitation against trade monopolies was severe. When its affairs brought it into collision with foreign powers, it had to allow the Crown to conduct negotiations on its behalf; and the Crown often sacrificed its interests for more general considerations. The result was an inevitable weakness in the Company's behaviour, failure to support its servants abroad, and want of confidence on the part of investors at home. The chances during its first sixty years seemed

against its survival ; and that it did survive was due less to the efficiency of its management than to the sterling qualities of the men who served it in the East. The Dutch Company, on the other hand, was closely bound to the state. Six of the seven provinces nominated members to the board of directors, and there was no fear of the government countenancing attacks from within. The Dutch war with Spain continued (with a twelve years' interval of truce) until 1648. The nation had to bear an enormous expenditure for the defence of its land frontier, and it was fanatically convinced that the necessary wealth could be drawn only from the East. The Company was therefore a part of the State, maintained and not attacked by public opinion, and receiving support for any measures, however vigorous, it might find necessary to maintain its hold upon its conquests.

It will be convenient first to follow the fortunes of the Dutch Company. In the early years its factors appeared to the natives of the eastern islands, not in the guise of conquerors, but of liberators from Portuguese tyranny. They made commercial treaties on fair terms with native sovereigns, established factories by their favour, and studied the strategy of the archipelago. Portugal made but a feeble resistance, for the day of her power was done. In 1606 a decisive naval combat was fought in the Straits of Malacca, and thereafter Portuguese warships gave little trouble to the intruders. One by one Portuguese factories were relinquished, or saw their trade sink into insignificance beside that of more vigorous rival establishments. Malacca itself did not fall until 1641, but long before that date the Dutch were supreme. By 1616 they had no less than fifteen forts among the islands. There existed an alternative gate into the Eastern seas through the Strait of Sunda between Sumatra and Java. The Dutch made sure of its control by building their new head-quarters at Batavia near the entrance. Outside the archipelago they pushed on to Japan, whose European trade they long monopolized. Before 1640 they had a footing in Ceylon, and by 1656 they had completed

the conquest of that island from the Portuguese. They also established posts in India and a small colony at Cape Town in 1652 to facilitate the long voyage into the Indian Ocean.

As Portuguese power in the islands fell the Dutch attitude to the natives changed. The greatest profits were made from the cloves and nutmegs produced in the little islets of the Banda Sea. The Dutch adopted the policy of restricting the supply in order to keep up prices. They conquered the Bandanese, removed a great proportion of them from their homes, and destroyed all the trees except those in plantations under their own control. Destruction of the spice trees was also the penalty whenever the natives were found trading with interlopers, of whom the sea-going Malays were the most important. By methods of terror quite as ruthless as those of Portugal, a monopoly was thus riveted upon the whole spice area. For cheapness of administration the general plan adopted was that of protectorates, the native chiefs being left in office but held strictly accountable for the doings of their subjects. But in the neighbourhood of important posts the Dutch officials carried on the government themselves. The Chinese Empire maintained a steady resistance to Dutch penetration, and in order to stimulate a trade the policy was therefore adopted of encouraging Chinamen to settle in the Dutch possessions. Between the Dutch and the Portuguese as empire-builders in the East there is little to choose save in stubbornness and efficiency. Both were predominantly economic in their motives; trade and profit were generally the sole consideration. The Portuguese indeed paid lip-service to the cause of Christianity, and encouraged their religious to missionary efforts which their general conduct inevitably nullified. The Dutch simply washed their hands of such matters. In the sphere of politics and government both brought nothing but degradation to the Asiatics with whom they came in contact. The chief reason was that they undertook to dominate with tiny forces; and the weak can seldom afford to be tolerant and just.

The English East India Company during its early years sought to carry on a spice trade in the islands side by side with the Dutch. Its first expedition, under Sir James Lancaster, sailed in 1601, and returned in 1603 with a cargo of pepper from Achin and Bantam and the spoils of a Portuguese carrack taken by the way. The subsequent expeditions pushed on into the Moluccas for more costly spices. So long as the Portuguese remained to be defeated the Dutch and English did not clash, although they eyed one another with suspicion. The European situation, with the Dutch still fighting for independence from Spain, was also a deterrent to high-handed action in the East. Yet the Dutch Company considered itself

aggrieved. It was first in the Moluccas by several years, it had embarked far more capital in the enterprise than had the English, and it employed at least four times as many ships and men. All these, according to the mercantile canons of the day, were arguments to justify an exclusive monopoly. After 1609, when the twelve years' truce with Spain commenced, relations became strained, and the two companies' servants were ere long at open war. Fighting consumed profits, and the two govern-




A Dutch East Indiaman, 17th century
(From an engraving by W Hollar in the British Museum)

ments in Europe negotiated. To James I the East India Company was but a minor piece in the game of statecraft. He sacrificed its interests in a treaty which placed his subjects at an intolerable disadvantage, and then left them unaided to make the best of a bad business. The Dutch read his mind correctly. They saw that he cared little for the issue, and determined to assert their monopoly before the situation changed. Without interference from Europe the stronger company was certain to win. By a series of oppressive actions the Dutch edged out the English factors from post after post, the process culminating with the murder of ten English merchants and the torture of several others at Amboyna in 1623. This ended English trade in the Moluccas; and even in Java and Sumatra, on the homeward fringe of the archipelago, it could only maintain a precarious and shrinking hold.

Meanwhile the Company had, fortunately for itself, been developing a subsidiary trade in India. In 1607-9 it established a factory at Surat by leave of Jehangir, the Mogul Emperor who now ruled all the northern plain and was grasping the Deccan and the Carnatic coast. The Portuguese at Goa objected, and sent forces to deny access to the English ships. But in 1612 and again in 1615 the Goa armaments were defeated in serious naval actions, and the English established their trade. In 1622 the intruders took the offensive, and captured the Portuguese island of Ormuz in the Persian Gulf, a controlling-point for the trade of a large area. These events coincided with Portuguese losses elsewhere, and the two combatants found it advisable to combine against Dutch aggression. In 1635 Portugal threw open her Indian harbours to English shipping, and her farther decline was peaceably accomplished.

During the remainder of the seventeenth century the English Company acquired posts in other parts of India. About 1633 it had factories at Balasore and Masulipatam. In 1639 it began the fortification of Fort St. George at Madras. In 1650 it opened

business at Hughli in Bengal, and in 1662 Portugal ceded Bombay, which became the head-quarters on the western coast. Finally, in 1686-90, Job Charnock, the head merchant at Hughli, being subjected to oppression by the Nawab of Bengal, moved down the Ganges and established himself at Calcutta, a place rendered defensible by surrounding swamps and by the fact that it was accessible to sea-going ships.



These seventeenth-century factories were of two sorts, unfortified, like Surat and Hughli, and fortified, like Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta. It should be realized that the English possessions at this time were in no sense an empire, nor were they regarded as the nucleus of one. The merchants traded in the presence of native powers with whose sovereignty they had no wish to interfere. They were only too glad, in fact, to be relieved of the duty of administration. Their fortifications, except at Calcutta, were designed against European enemies from the sea. This state of affairs was not destined to endure, for as the seventeenth century gave place to the eighteenth the Mogul empire collapsed, and

India became a chaos in which Europeans were ultimately obliged to assume sovereignty or perish. This, and not any imperialistic ambition, was the cause which made the East India merchants the rulers of the country ; but it had not begun to operate during the first century of their existence.

The French were the last of the sea powers to enter the Indian Ocean, and they served a longer apprenticeship before attaining a solid position on its shores. French companies were chartered in 1604, 1611, and 1615, but none of them achieved any success or endured for more than a short season. In 1642 a more serious undertaking appeared in Richelieu's Company of the Indies, which went so far as to plant settlements in Madagascar as bases for the Eastern trade. The plan proved unsound owing to the large and hostile native population, and the Madagascar posts were abandoned after a few years' effort, whilst nothing was accomplished elsewhere. French success begins only with the East India Company of 1664, founded by Colbert, the great finance minister of Louis XIV. This body wasted little strength on Madagascar, preferring the more manageable bases of Bourbon and Mauritius instead. It pushed on without delay to India, opening unfortified depots at Surat and Masulipatam in 1668-9. In the Carnatic it founded the strong factory of Pondicherry in 1674, and before the close of the century it had another defensible place at Chandernagore in Bengal. French trade was at first active, in spite of wars with the Dutch, but the Company never attained the steady dividend-paying capacity of its English rival in its best days. This, however, was no great drawback in French eyes, for with them chartered companies were regarded rather as departments of the State than as commercial bodies, and were valued on political rather than economic grounds. This was the tradition founded by Cardinal Richelieu, and it goes far to explain the inefficacy of this form of expansion in French hands.

*The English, French, and Dutch in the
Atlantic*

THE expansion of Europe, as we have said, has proceeded mainly by the sea, and consequently the true units in which the interest of the subject groups itself are the oceans rather than the continents. The pioneers and their governments regarded the matter from the point of view of ocean routes. The Portuguese occupied Goa and Ormuz and Malacca, not as bases for the colonization of the interior, but as controlling-points for the traffic of the Indian Ocean. The Dutch planted settlers at Cape Town merely as a stage on the way to the East, and without the slightest prescience that their handful of farmers would expand into a great white dominion. Particularly is this true of the North Atlantic. The colonists of North America, the planters of the Caribbean, and the factors in the African slaving-posts, all faced to the sea and not to the interior. Temperate America produced foodstuffs for the slaves in the plantation-colonies, and took their sugar and tobacco in return; Africa sent labour to the same plantations; all supplied Europe with raw materials for manufacture, and formed for her an ever-growing market which expanded until the demand for factory products gave rise to the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century in whose toils we are involved to this day. The North Atlantic thus appears as a quadrilateral, with its corners in Europe, Africa, the Caribbean, and North America, and intersected by tracks through the common medium between. This remains the central thread round which the subject crystallizes until the beginning of the nineteenth century, at which time the growth of population and the improvement of land-transport transferred to the interiors of the continents some of the importance hitherto monopolized by their ocean coasts. But even in our own time one ocean, the Pacific,

is still the common unit for the study of the interaction of the diverse nationalities dwelling on its shores.

Spanish colonization has little direct responsibility for the great speeding-up process which forms the reaction of Atlantic enterprise upon European life. Spain planted, not mercantile outposts, but rather separate sovereignties, closely bound politically to the Spanish Crown, but with a minimum of commercial nexus with the Spanish people. Apart from the provision of official posts for men of good family, and the influx of treasure from the mines—a treasure which promptly leaked away into Europe at large by channels which no ingenuity could dam—the Spanish empire in the West produced little effect upon the social organization of Spain at home. Upon the more businesslike northern nations the effect of their expansion was far different, and it is with their proceedings that we have now to deal.

France claims the honour of being first in the field with actual settlements planted in the West, although England—by a year—scored the first permanent success. Roberval's post in Canada in 1542 we have already mentioned. It was followed by a Huguenot attempt to plant a colony of refuge in Brazil. In 1555 one Nicholas Durand, who preferred to call himself Villegagnon, led a party to that coast and settled them on an island in the bay of Rio de Janeiro. Calvinist theology proved the ruin of this undertaking; the colonists split into hostile factions, and the survivors abandoned the place after a brief trial. Next, in 1562, Jean Ribault, another Huguenot, formed a settlement at St. Augustine on the coast of Florida. This endured, with vicissitudes, until 1565, when the Spaniards raided it and massacred the greater part of its occupants. At the close of the sixteenth century fresh unsuccessful attempts were made on the St. Lawrence and in Acadia (Nova Scotia). Finally, in 1608, Samuel de Champlain permanently founded Quebec; and at the same time another party successfully broke ground at Port Royal in Acadia. Frenchmen also took part in the Newfoundland fishery, but not until

long afterwards did they take possession of any part of the soil of the island.

The French colony in Acadia developed very slowly as a self-sufficing agricultural community, shut off from the world at large, never more than a few thousand strong, and bearing little part in the scheme of Atlantic business. So it remained until its conquest by the British at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and even for many years thereafter. The St. Lawrence colony, or Canada as it is more convenient to name it, became, on the other hand, of first-class importance. It developed a valuable fur trade, and its strategic position on a great waterway offered the prospect of dominating the fate of the whole continent. Yet the growth of its population, the truest test of a colony's strength, was very slow. By 1663 it contained only 2,500 Frenchmen, and by 1763, when it passed under the British flag, not more than 70,000. Even so, Canada found difficulty in feeding itself, and commonly relied upon imports of corn from adjacent regions. France, in fact, produced the different types of emigrant required in disproportionate numbers—always a sufficiency and even an excess of captains, explorers, missionaries, adventurers, but never enough working peasants who would settle down soberly to cultivate the soil.

Cardinal Richelieu left a permanent mark upon the mould of French expansion. He believed, as did most of his contemporaries in northern Europe, that colonization was a form of commercial enterprise; he had also a passion for centralization, for bringing every manifestation of French energy within the grip of government control. Accordingly, he favoured the chartered company as the ideal method of expansion. But the French chartered companies of the seventeenth century were very different bodies from those of England and the United Provinces. In England the chartered company was a form of private enterprise. Its monopoly of its trading area was protected by the State, but it governed itself and managed its own business

with a comparatively free hand. Only if it did so in such a manner as to lay itself open to the charge of damaging the welfare of the country at large did it give ground for state interference. With the Dutch the company and the state were more closely connected, but the state itself was a middle-class oligarchy in which the merchants furnished the bulk of the controlling opinion. In France the whole tendency was towards an absolute monarchy, working through a bureaucracy recruited from the noble class, to which the traders were expected to yield willing service without claiming to exercise any control by the expression of their opinions. Richelieu's companies were therefore managed as departments of the state in which the function of the mercantile investor was to furnish the working capital and to supply officials only to the lower grades of the service. The system was not strikingly successful.

In 1627 Richelieu chartered the Company of the Hundred Associates, or of New France, to take control of Canada and Acadia, and to claim also the whole coastline of North America. As we have said, progress under this body was slow. It hampered the liberty and enterprise of the humbler colonists, managed its affairs with considerable corruption, and failed to yield any substantial profit to its investors. In the sphere of exploration, however, it did good work, chiefly by the agency of Jesuit missionaries and of adventurous laymen who could not endure the restrictions upon private enterprise prevailing in the more settled parts of the colony. French explorers charted the great lakes, opened up a fur-trade with the Indians of the far interior, and towards the end of the century descended the Mississippi from its source to the Gulf of Mexico. The Jesuits distinguished themselves by their fearless self-sacrifice and reaped their reward by gaining a real hold upon the red men which proved a considerable military asset in the later days of the Anglo-French struggle for the continent. In 1664 Jean Baptiste Colbert, the financial and colonial minister of the young Louis XIV, reorganized the

Atlantic interests of France under the Company of the West. This body controlled not only the North American settlements but also the French West Indian colonies and the African slave-trade which had been coming into existence since the beginning of the century. Colbert thus showed his recognition of the political and strategic unity of the Atlantic area under the conditions of his time. His later proceedings indicate an advance upon Richelieu in comprehension of true colonial interests, for in 1674 he abolished the Company of the West and placed New France and the West Indies under the direct rule of the Crown. He thus eliminated the motive of private profit so undesirable in the governance of colonies, but he continued the centralized bureaucratic system which seemed natural to French political thought. The government of Canada was shared between three persons, the Governor and the Intendant, respectively the military and civil chiefs, and the Bishop of Quebec. These and most of their subordinates were of home appointment; and there was no political organ whereby the public opinion of the colonists could express itself. French feudal society reproduced itself in Canada in a small and unprogressive agricultural population of *seigneurs* and peasants, never making adequate use of the resources of the country; and around it roved a fluid body of adventurers, hunters, trappers, and illicit traders, invaluable as soldiers in such a landscape, but not particularly desirable as citizens.

The English colonists of North America, with whom the French were ultimately to measure themselves, began their work at the same time, but developed their character in very different directions. The true pioneer, if we omit the shadowy adventurers who may or may not have founded posts in the North-West under Henry VII, was Sir Humphrey Gilbert. He was convinced of the existence of the North-West Passage, and he gathered round him a group of sympathizers who amongst them gave prominence to the ideas that England was dangerously over-populated and that emigration would be a relief, that the Indians of North

America would constitute a great market for the sale of manufactures, that the precious metals might be found in abundance, that naval stores could be produced to render England independent of the Baltic supply, that the proposed colonies would be a half-way house on the road to Asia, and that the religious difficulty at home would be eased by the provision of a Catholic colony of refuge. Most of these arguments proved to be fallacious, but they formed the mainspring of English colonization until about the year 1620.

Gilbert obtained a patent from Queen Elizabeth in 1578, but did not act seriously upon it until 1583. In that year he took the northward course across the Atlantic, annexed Newfoundland—an empty form not followed by occupation—and sought to establish a colony on the shores of Nova Scotia. He lost his largest ship before achieving his purpose, turned homewards with the intention of trying again next year, and was drowned on the voyage by the foundering of the pinnace in which he sailed. His half-brother, Sir Walter Raleigh, took up the work, and in 1584-7 dispatched expeditions which planted two successive colonies on an island adjoining the coast of what is now North Carolina—which Raleigh named Virginia. The Spanish war killed the enterprise by necessitating the retention of all shipping for home defence in 1588. When a relief party at length reached the colony its occupants had disappeared. Nothing further was done until after the conclusion of peace in 1604.

The peace treaty was silent upon the right of Englishmen to colonize North America, but the policy of English governments, after as during the war, was that the monopolistic interpretation of the papal bulls was invalid. England would recognize Spanish claims based upon occupation, but not upon prescription. Accordingly in 1606 James I chartered a body which developed into the Virginia Company, and in 1607 its first expedition founded the post of Jamestown on Chesapeake Bay. Early Virginia was the scene of futile experiments in searching for an Asiatic passage, in

unsuitable agriculture, and in a communal organization of society, to the accompaniment of a terrible mortality among the colonists. After ten years of suffering the tide turned with the allotment of freeholds to the more experienced settlers, the adoption of tobacco-planting as a staple industry, and the granting of a constitution with an elected Assembly of burgesses in 1619. Thenceforward prosperity steadily increased. Men of substance were encouraged to go out and take up estates, and English merchants to operate others through agents. Agricultural labourers had their passages paid as indentured servants, becoming free labourers and sometimes proprietors after serving their time. At a later date negro slaves were imported in large numbers from Africa. All this depended upon the planting of tobacco, for which Europe developed a sudden and permanent demand; although, as competing colonies were opened up, prices fell and the large profits of the first years ceased to be possible. In Virginia, in fact, Englishmen worked out the true methods of the plantation colony, with its reliance upon a single staple and servile labour. The type has now passed away, but it had an enormous effect upon the increase of European wealth and all the reactions which have flowed therefrom. The Virginia Company never earned a profit from its colony, and in its later years, under the guidance of the enlightened Sir Edwin Sandys, it ceased to expect one, regarding itself rather as carrying out a trust for the national good. Factions in the company paved the way for its downfall, and in 1623 James I revoked its charter and made Virginia a crown colony, with a governor and council appointed from home and an assembly elected by the inhabitants.

The first fifteen years of the reign of Charles I were a time of great material prosperity in England—an unusual prelude to the outbreak of a revolution which was to sweep away the throne. Trade was brisk, capital accumulated, and population increased; and colonization shared in the new impetus experienced by all forms of national activity. In 1632 Lord Baltimore, a Catholic,

who had already concerned himself with a settlement in Newfoundland, obtained a patent for the colonization of the northern part of Chesapeake Bay, which was to be called Maryland. He died before he could accomplish the project, but his son, the second Lord Baltimore, sent out an expedition which founded the colony in 1634. Maryland was prosperous and well managed from the outset, and there was never any doubt of its success. Like Virginia, it devoted itself to the cultivation of tobacco, and became the second plantation colony on the mainland of North America. In its early years it attracted a large number of Catholics, whose practice of their religion was tacitly recognized by the home government. In its political type it was a proprietary colony, that is to say, the Crown delegated most of the royal powers to the Lord Proprietor, who appointed officials, presided over the administration, and received the revenues without interference. The Lords Baltimore proved excellent rulers, maintaining their control, with certain periods of suspension, far into the eighteenth century. Like the Virginia Company, they early found it expedient to grant representative institutions to their subjects.

Meanwhile colonies of a different sort had been springing up upon the northern section of the present United States coastline, in the region known as New England. In 1608 a small body of nonconformist Puritans had emigrated from the villages bordering the Trent valley to the United Provinces. After twelve years' residence at Amsterdam and Leyden they had grown into a substantial community of which the more forward section decided to re-emigrate to America. In 1620 they did so, the pioneers to the number of about a hundred crossing the Atlantic in the *Mayflower* and settling at Plymouth, on the shore of the bay enclosed by Cape Cod. The Pilgrim Fathers, to use the name invented for them by modern historians, had great hardships and difficulties to contend with. They had no royal charter or influential support, they were ill-supplied, and they settled in a bleak climate at an unfavourable season of the year. Half of them perished in the

first winter, but the remainder, reinforced by new arrivals from England and the Netherlands, made good their hold upon the country. Ultimately they attained a sober prosperity based upon fishing, fur-trading, and mixed agriculture of the English type.

The early proceedings of Charles I gave deep offence to a far larger and wealthier body of Puritans who had hitherto conformed to the ritual of the Church of England. In 1628-9 the pioneers of this party determined to plant a colony of refuge upon the shores of Massachusetts Bay, adjoining the Pilgrims' Plymouth. For this purpose they obtained letters patent constituting them a chartered company. But the Massachusetts Company took a unique course as compared with similar bodies. Instead of residing in England and controlling the colony from London, under the eye of the home government, the governors, assistants, and stockholders emigrated in person to Massachusetts, taking their charter with them. By so doing they severed themselves from effective supervision and became for many purposes an independent state. With far more money and men at its disposal, Massachusetts rapidly outstripped Plymouth in size and prestige. The decade 1630-40 witnessed a greater flow of English emigration than did any other period of the seventeenth century. This was stimulated partly by the prosperous times which tempted capitalists to adventure of their superfluity, and partly by the reactionary government of Charles I which convinced many liberal-minded men that religious and political liberty were doomed in England. The malcontent Puritan element found its way chiefly to New England. There Massachusetts became rich and strong and threw off daughter colonies in Rhode Island and Connecticut, gaining also a certain unrecognized control over the coastal region of Maine to the northward. Another body of Puritans from England founded New Haven in 1638. In the latter part of the seventeenth century there was a consolidation, Connecticut absorbing New Haven in 1663, and Massachusetts Plymouth in 1691.

The New England colonies formed a group apart from the general tendency of the British Empire. They were situated in a temperate region supporting an agriculture and domestic industries similar to those of the Mother Country. Their trade with her was therefore unimportant, and was not much valued by imperial statesmen. In addition, their religion, politics, and general attitude were frowned upon. In New England the Puritan churches were the bases of society. The fully qualified church members, few in number, co-opted and not elected from below, alone enjoyed the political franchise, and ruled the community ; and each New England state appointed its own governor and his council instead of receiving these officials at the nomination of the home government. This latter arrangement was indeed modified in the eighteenth century, but the political and economic bond between New and Old England remained of the slightest, and the seeds of the Declaration of Independence may truly be said to have been planted by the *Mayflower's* crew in 1620.

Henry Hudson, the English explorer, sailing in the Dutch service in search of an Asiatic passage in 1609, entered the broad waters of the Hudson River, and penetrated far inland into an attractive country. His employers followed up the discovery by planting the posts of New Amsterdam at the mouth of the Hudson and Rensselaerswyk (now Albany) in the interior. These became the nucleus of the Dutch colony of New Netherland. Somewhat later Sweden, stimulated by the genius of Gustavus Adolphus, undertook to be a colonizing power, and Swedish pioneers were planted on the estuary of the Delaware River in 1638. In 1655, the Dutch and Swedes being at war in Europe, New Netherland conquered the Delaware and absorbed it into her own borders. The Dutchmen as colonists compared poorly with their neighbours the New Englanders. Occupying one of the fairest regions of America, they did little to make it essentially their own. Their numbers were scanty, and like the French they preferred to trade rather than to dig. They were apathetic towards political rights,

and consequently their corporate sense and loyalty remained undeveloped. Over them hung the blighting shadow of the Dutch West India Company, their rulers, a body which, however successful in slave-trading and privateering, was unfit to preside over the growth of a *colonie de peuplement*, as the Hudson region was destined to become. In 1664 a world-wide colonial war was beginning between England and the United Provinces. English statesmen were already aggrieved by infringements of the Navigation Acts by the factors of New Amsterdam. Charles II therefore commissioned his brother the Duke of York to conquer the Dutch colony, giving him a patent to become its Lord Proprietor. The Duke of York sent out a small force which effected the conquest almost without the firing of a shot, and New Amsterdam became New York. The Duke divided his acquisition, breaking off the southern part under the name of New Jersey as a separate proprietary colony under some favourites of his own. Delaware became a separate unit at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

The reign of Charles II saw the establishment of other proprietary colonies which completed the English occupation of the greater part of the North American coastline. In 1663 eight prominent men became joint proprietors of the region called Carolina, stretching from Virginia southwards to the Savannah River. It was a huge tract, and at first little was made of it. Ultimately the scattered settlements formed upon the coast grouped themselves into the two states of North and South Carolina, of which the latter in the eighteenth century became a rich plantation colony subsisting upon the cultivation of rice. In 1681 the Quaker, William Penn, a large creditor of the government, commuted his claim for a proprietary grant of Pennsylvania, a region lying north of Maryland and west of New York. Penn admitted his own sect and all others, and his colony thrived rapidly. With New York and New Jersey it constituted the group known as the Middle Colonies, agricultural like New England, but lacking the New England peculiarities in politics and religion.

The total population of the English North American colonies was estimated in 1700 to be about 200,000, and thenceforward there was a doubling of numbers roughly every twenty years.

The Guiana coast attracted the attention of the new colonizing powers from the opening of the seventeenth century. In western Guiana the Dutch formed permanent settlements, partly for the native trade, partly for plantation, notably in the Essequibo and Berbice Rivers. In eastern Guiana similar English attempts on the Wiapoco were unsuccessful, as were those of the French in the same region. In the Amazon delta English and Dutch settled in considerable numbers between 1610 and 1633 in order to form tobacco and sugar plantations, but the Portuguese never left them long undisturbed, and finally drove them all out. The one permanent Guiana colony of English foundation was on the Surinam River (1651). It flourished and expanded, but was taken by the Dutch in the war of 1664-7, and retained by them at the peace in exchange for New York. The French, after many failures, succeeded in establishing a struggling settlement on the Cayenne River, which has grown into the present French Guiana. Farther east, in the Pernambuco region of Brazil, the Dutch began in 1624 a series of conquests which promised to be permanent and to detach the whole country from the Portuguese Empire. After twenty years' success, however, the tide turned. Portugal freed herself from Spanish domination in 1640, and a revival of energy and patriotism, at home and among her colonists, resulted in the total expulsion of the Dutch from Brazil. In South America, then, the northern sea powers were able to establish themselves only in Guiana, the sole sector of the coastline unoccupied by Spain or Portugal.

As soon as Virginia had demonstrated the financial success to be attained by tobacco plantation, enterprising men began to prospect for suitable sites for other tobacco colonies. The Bermudas, rediscovered in 1609 by the servants of the Virginia Company, were early utilized for this purpose, and it was this which



St. Christopher in the 17th century, showing the English quarters in the centre and French at either end
 (From Du Tertre's *Histoire des Antilles*, 1667).

took Englishmen and Frenchmen into the West Indies proper. In 1623 Thomas Warner, one of the Amazon planters, made a tour through the Lesser Antilles, unoccupied by Spain but tenanted by the man-eating Caribs. He chose St. Christopher as the best island for his purpose, and landed there with a few companions in January 1624 to form a permanent settlement. The scantiness of his numbers in face of the Caribs caused him to welcome some French adventurers in the following year. The two nationalities divided the island, and planted tobacco with great success. From St. Christopher the English spread to the other islands of the Leeward group, Nevis, Montserrat, and Antigua, whilst the French broke new ground at Martinique and Guadeloupe (*c.* 1635). The greatest prize amongst the Lesser Antilles proved to be Barbados, owing to the fertility of its soil and the absence of the Caribs, who did great damage to the other plantations. Englishmen led by John and Henry Powell began to plant Barbados in 1627.

Emigration to all these colonies was very brisk; Barbados had 30,000 inhabitants within twenty years of its foundation. Mercantile firms and landowners, tired of the political uncertainties of Charles I's reign, took up plantations, which soon became valuable properties—£7,000 was paid in 1647 for a half-share in a Barbadian estate of 500 acres. About 1640 there began the economic revolution which for nearly two centuries rendered the West Indies the most coveted plantation-colonies in the world. Tobacco, owing to over-production, was becoming a drug in the market, and Dutchmen from Brazil introduced the more difficult art of sugar-planting. Sugar yielded four times the profit per acre of tobacco, and the more progressive landowners made great fortunes. The increase of capital stimulated a demand for negro slaves who now for the first time began to cross the ocean in a great and steady stream. These developments occurred in all the French and English islands to a greater or less extent. Each nation also acquired from Spain a footing in the Greater

Antilles—the English by the conquest of Jamaica in 1655, and the French by the gradual overrunning of the western half of Hispaniola, which became their colony of Hayti, a process complete by the end of the seventeenth century. The Dutch also took up a few holdings in the Antilles, St. Martin and St. Eustatius in the Leeward group, and Curaçoa and its neighbours off the coast of the Spanish Main. They used them, however, less for plantation than as bases for trade with the adjoining colonies of other nations. It was the ambition of the Dutch to engross the trade of the Atlantic area, whilst leaving to nations with greater manpower the task of actually producing the commodities. In a free-trading world this policy would have been justified, for the Dutch were unsurpassed in the management of merchant shipping and mercantile finance. In the seventeenth century it was not long before the jealousy of the French and English was aroused, and measures were taken to abate the Dutch ascendancy.

The foundation of the plantation colonies gave to West Africa a greater importance than it had hitherto possessed, for they demanded labour in large masses where the Spanish Empire had only absorbed it in a comparatively scanty stream. English African companies were founded in 1618 and 1630 with little success, their only permanent result being the occupation of a fort



A Carib of the Antilles
(From Labat's *Nouveau Voyage aux Isles de l'Amérique*)

at the mouth of the Gambia River. The French recruited slaves from the Senegal River, where their Guinea Company was active towards the close of the seventeenth century ; but both English and French at first paid as much attention to gold and vegetable products as to slaving. The Dutch, on the other hand, made a bold effort to grasp the whole slave trade as part of their larger scheme of Atlantic monopoly. The re-opening of their war with Spain and Portugal in 1621, coinciding with the formation of their West India Company, gave them the opportunity and the organization. They began a conquest of the Portuguese stations on the Gold Coast, taking Elmina, the head-quarters, in 1638. For more than twenty years from that date they had the bulk of the slave trade in their hands. The English Restoration of 1660 produced a rival, for Charles II not only allied himself with the enfeebled Portuguese Empire and received from it Bombay and Tangier as a marriage portion, but also placed his brother at the head of a strong joint-stock company, called the Royal Adventurers to Africa. The operations of this body were the prime cause of the war of 1664, for it began to open stations competing with those of the Dutch. In 1672 the Royal Adventurers, having suffered severe losses in the war, were merged into a new foundation called the Royal African Company, which acquired many slaving posts and maintained a steady supply to the West Indies. In practice, however, no company was able to monopolize the trade completely, for interlopers always found a ready market in the west. Having no permanent overhead charges they were able to sell at lower prices, and the planters therefore encouraged them. The English slave trade (apart from the Company's share) was at first chiefly managed from Bristol, and afterwards in the eighteenth century was the making of Liverpool as an oceanic port.

We have now traced the foundation of the old colonial empires of the Atlantic. A complementary topic is that of the Navigation Laws designed to confirm the monopolies so eagerly sought after.

Spain and Portugal had from the outset prohibited the trade of foreigners with their possessions, and it seemed natural to the newer powers to do the like. James I and Charles I issued various Orders in Council designed to exclude the Dutch traders from their colonies. These were in the main ineffective because naval squadrons were not sent out to enforce them. The Commonwealth,

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Minuteman

*Debts due unto Hubert
of West India Company as appears by books in
this place a July 28th 1664*

	Tobacco
<i>Mr. Henry</i>	3500
<i>Mr. James Greathings</i>	2550
<i>Mr. Henry</i>	2615
<i>Mr. George</i>	1474
<i>Mr. Boyce</i>	-646
<i>Mr. Chagton</i>	-954
<i>Mr. Finch</i>	1252
<i>Mr. Hendrick</i>	1202
<i>Mr. Zenger</i>	-443
<i>Mr. Fiddens</i>	2065
<i>William Sumors</i>	-204
	-92

A West Indian account-book, showing debts reckoned in a tobacco currency
(From Brit. Mus. Egerton MSS. 2395)

stronger at sea, resorted to stronger legislation, and the Navigation Acts of 1650 and 1651 had together the effect of prohibiting all foreigners' trade with English colonies and the employment of foreign shipping by English merchants. The Restoration Navigation Acts of 1660 and 1663 maintained this policy and ordered further that all the chief colonial products were to be shipped only to England and that no manufactured goods were

to be received by the colonies from the continent of Europe. France under Colbert adopted a similar code, varying in details. The Dutch also excluded foreigners from any of their colonies which produced valuable merchandise. But each power, whilst resolute to maintain its own monopoly, sought opportunities for infringing that of others. The Dutch therefore found it worth



The Fortress of Elmina after its capture by the Dutch
(From Churchill's *Voyages*, Vol. V)

while to keep open some of their colonial ports in order to tempt adjacent English and French planters to break their own laws.

This cut-throat competition inevitably produced wars. In 1652-4, 1664-7, and 1672-4 the English fought against the Dutch with the result that, whilst the battle honours were divided, Dutch Atlantic power declined and that of England grew. The English Navigation Acts, evaded at first, were afterwards more strongly enforced, to the ruin of the Dutch plan of dominating

the Atlantic by mercantile efficiency. The Dutch share in the general European wars of 1672-8, 1688-97, and 1701-13 imposed a burden too great for a small country to bear, and the general outcome was that at the beginning of the eighteenth century the United Provinces had become a second-class power, strong only in the Far East, whilst Great Britain and France stood forward as the rivals of the future.

6

*The Colonial Wars and the Fall of the
Old Empires*

(i) *The Contest for Colonial Supremacy*

As the seventeenth century gave place to the eighteenth there was noticeable a change in the attitude of nations, and particularly of the British and French, towards colonial expansion. Hitherto this activity had been the affair of the mercantile class—the moneyed interest, in contemporary phrase—and of the statesmen; the former engaging in it for their individual advantage, and the latter patronizing it because they were convinced that colonial possessions would increase national power. The colonial trade, it was held, would add to the wealth of the community, and would give employment to a mercantile marine without whose aid a state navy could not be efficiently manned. The general public, however, had not been very deeply moved by these considerations, being more interested in religious controversies and domestic politics. To England the Revolution of 1688 and to France the steady purpose and protracted reign of Louis XIV (*d.* 1715) gave a stability destined to endure for two long generations. Religion and the political constitution became in either country settled questions, and a greater share of the national interest became available for external matters. Accordingly we find arising

a perfervid imperialism, eager for colonial expansion and intensely jealous of foreign undertakings in the same field ; and this sentiment obtained a hold upon classes who had little material gain to expect from success. Nothing in our own political record is more remarkable than the manner in which an aggressive imperial policy was acclaimed in the eighteenth century by a parliament consisting of landowners and their nominees, to whom the result of the most triumphant conquests could mean little but increased taxation. Yet the widespread grip of this sentiment is an established fact, an illustration of the truth that moral considerations so often transcend material as the governing forces of history. In France the general public was almost equally infected with the same enthusiasm, only the higher circle of statesmanship remaining comparatively cold to it. And even in apathetic Spain there was a distinct revival of energy and interest in the conduct of the great empire which had stagnated throughout the seventeenth century.

Round the two protagonists, Great Britain and France, the minor powers grouped themselves. The Dutch in the early part of the period were our allies, in the later our enemies ; Spain under Bourbon monarchs sided consistently with France ; Portugal strove to be neutral, but commercial connexions commonly inclined her to the British interest. The Baltic nations, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, constituted a group of inferior sea powers, of small fighting force but nevertheless important by reason of their control of the timber, pitch, and hemp so essential to wooden warships. Their aim was to make a profit by trading as neutrals whilst the great powers were destroying each other's fleets, and this brought them into sharp differences with England, whose interest was to establish a general blockade of her enemies' coasts. In addition, all the powers had European interests for which to fight—scientific frontiers and disputed successions and all the stock-in-trade of high diplomacy. These, although not the main concern of this account, must not be overlooked in a general view of motives. Except for our own country, they

were equal in importance to the colonial questions in the setting of the stage of the eighteenth century.

The fortunes of colonization and oceanic power were deeply interwoven with the first great war of the century, that of the Spanish Succession (1701-13), although all its most striking campaigns were fought out on the continent of Europe. The contest arose from the death of the last Hapsburg king of Spain

BUT I had another Reason which made me less forward to enlarge his Majesty's Dominions by my Discovery. To say the truth, I had conceived a few Scruples with relation to the Distributive Justice of Princes upon those Occasions. For instance, A Crew of Pyrates are driven by a Storm they know not whither, at length a Boy discovers Land from the Top-mast, they go on Shore to Rob and Plunder; they see an harmless People, are entertained with Kindness, they give the Country a new Name, they take formal Possession of it for their King, they set up a rotten Plank or a Stone for a Memorial, they murder two or three Dozen of the Natives, bring
away

the Houyhnhnms. 193

away a Couple more by Force for a Sample, return home, and get their Pardon. Here commences a new Dominion acquired with a Title by *Divine Right*. Ships are sent with the first Opportunity, the Natives driven out or destroyed, their Princes tortured to discover their Gold; a free Licence given to all Acts of Inhumanity and Lust, the Earth reeking with the Blood of its Inhabitants: And this execrable Crew of Butchers employed in so pious an Expedition, is a *modern Colony* sent to convert and civilize an idolatrous and barbarous People.

SWIFT'S VIEW OF COLONIZATION

(A passage from the first edition of *Gulliver's Travels*, 1726)

and the claim of the French Bourbons to the whole of his inheritance. Austria and the German princes objected on Continental grounds, England and Holland in addition because they dreaded the overwhelming sea power which might arise from an amalgamation of the French and Spanish Empires. Spanish sea power had long ceased to be aggressive, but in the hands of competent Frenchmen it would wear a different aspect; and the France of Louis XIV had already shown what it could do in East Indian trading, West Indian planting, and the creation of a navy. The war

was therefore waged by a general coalition against France and Spain, only a portion of the latter country favouring the allies. After terrific exertions it ended at the Treaty of Utrecht in a compromise. Louis XIV's younger grandson obtained the Spanish throne as Philip V, with a proviso against any eventual union of the French and Spanish crowns upon one head. With Spain went the Spanish colonies, but not the Spanish Netherlands, they being placed under Austrian control. France ceded to Great Britain the whole of Hudson's Bay, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia, together with the French portion of St. Christopher; Spain likewise ceded Gibraltar and Minorca, taken by English forces during the war, and the Asiento, or monopoly of supplying slaves to the Spanish colonies. In the colonial sphere the principal gainer was Great Britain, the Dutch having to content themselves with the protection afforded them against France by the presence of Austrian troops in the Netherlands.

A word of explanation is needed concerning Hudson's Bay and Newfoundland. The English Hudson's Bay Company had been founded in 1670 to carry on a fur trade with the Indians of the north. It was highly successful until French expeditions by sea and overland from Canada captured the majority of its forts. The French held their gains from before the close of the seventeenth century until 1713. By the treaty of that year they withdrew altogether, and the Hudson's Bay Company resumed its profitable career. Similarly, Newfoundland had first been colonized by a Bristol company in 1610, and a few English settlers had ever since existed in the peninsula of Avalon, the south-east corner of the island. The French also obtained a small foothold near by at Placentia. But the prime value of Newfoundland lay not in its colonists but in the employment it gave to thousands of English and French fishermen. These men spent the summer at the fishery and returned to England and France for the winter. They were thus easily available for impressment into their countries' fleets on the outbreak of war. The Treaty of Utrecht, whilst


giving the sovereignty of Newfoundland to Britain, reserved to France the fishing rights on two-fifths of its coastline, an arrangement which gave rise to two centuries of disputes ending only in 1904. By the treaty of that year the French rights were extinguished in return for concessions elsewhere.

The Treaty of Utrecht was followed by a long though troubled peace, lasting in the colonial sphere until 1739. During that peace Great Britain (England and Scotland were united in 1707) reaped the reward of the naval supremacy she had gained during the war. Although her home population seems only to have increased by some 15 per cent. during that period, the value of her foreign and colonial trade went up by 40 per cent. The population of the American colonies, about 200,000 in 1700, was over a million by 1750. The West Indian plantations recruited thousands of negroes every year, and devoted themselves ever more intensively to sugar-growing to the exclusion of all else. They had therefore to draw their foodstuffs from the fishermen of Newfoundland and the farmers of America, whilst the Mother Country supplied manufactures to all. The growing colonial markets led to an increase in the industrial population at home. The capital accumulated from this trade, rendered more flexible by the development of banks and joint-stock companies, was available for the exploitation of new methods of production. The result was the industrial revolution of the latter half of the eighteenth century; for the machines, the adjunct of the markets and the money, were rapidly invented as the demand for them arose.

In France the same factors were at work, but on a diminished scale. The population of her colonies was smaller, and her home population much larger, than in the case of England. The interaction between the two was therefore less pronounced. France also was slow to adopt the new methods of banking and finance, and her natural wealth did not to any great extent take the form of flexible capital easily directed to new enterprises.

The disastrous failure of Law's Mississippi scheme in 1720 begot a distrust of financial novelties which endured for a century. Nevertheless, the French Empire emerged from the state of weakness to which the War of the Spanish Succession had reduced it. The mercantile marine revived, and the navy received some attention. Canada at length began to grow, although far in arrear of its southern neighbours. The great fortress of Louisbourg arose on Cape Breton Island to guard the mouth of the St. Lawrence. The colony of Louisiana took shape at the mouth of the Mississippi, New Orleans being founded in 1717; and the progress of French pioneers on the two chief waterways of America became a strategical portent threatening the exclusion of the British from the West. The East India Company, moribund in 1713, renewed its vigour and entered upon the most prosperous period of its career. But it was in the West Indies that the French revival was most evident. There the French colonist was in congenial surroundings, and he developed a genius for the sugar business which was aided by the wise relaxation of mercantile restrictions imposed from home. Occupying islands larger than those of the British, and with a less exhausted soil, the French planter thrived throughout the eighteenth century until the Revolution of 1789 proved his ruin.

The separation of the French and Spanish governments, insisted upon by the Treaty of Utrecht, proved to be more of a reality than their opponents had feared. For some time indeed the French and Spanish Bourbons were upon positively hostile terms, although they drew together in 1733 by the secret Family Compact, a treaty for promoting their continental ambitions and aiming against the maritime supremacy of Great Britain. There was no French re-organization of the Spanish Empire, but it did to some extent put its own house in order. It built excellent warships which it never learned to use, and from 1730 made an effort to stop the illicit British trade with its South American colonies. Holland sank ever into less importance in the Atlantic,



and even in the Indian Ocean ceased all efforts to expand in India itself, preferring to concentrate attention upon the more easily maintained monopoly of the archipelago.

By 1739 England, rich, confident, and aggressive, and chafing under the cautious rule of Walpole, demanded the excitement of an adventure. She obtained it in a quarrel with Spain over the searching and indignities inflicted upon her merchantmen when suspected of illegal trading with the Spanish colonies. The Jenkins' Ear War, as it was called from an incident much discussed in the preliminary agitation, inaugurated a series of colonial conflicts almost unbroken until 1763. At the outset British efforts were directed against the Spanish possessions. An expedition took Porto Bello in 1739, but did not hold it. Then followed attempts against Cartagena and Cuba, which failed miserably; and Commodore Anson, following the example of Drake of old, entered the Pacific and raided the west coast of South America where, however, he was not strong enough to make permanent conquests. The Spanish war merged into one with France, a part of the general European conflict over the Austrian Succession. The Anglo-French contest eclipsed the Anglo-Spanish, for the latter was dying out by 1744; the Spanish Empire had made a successful passive defence, but was unable to hit back in its turn.

The colonial war with France will need to be followed in two separate theatres, the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. In India the English and French Companies had not previously fought, having entered into local agreements for neutrality during former wars. On this occasion, however, the circumstances were changed. The decay of the Mogul Empire and the resulting disorder in the country had compelled the Companies to arm more heavily. In the Carnatic province their settlements were close to one another and in keen competition; and there also the Governor of Pondicherry, Joseph François Dupleix, was convinced that an aggressive policy was now demanded by the times. In 1746 Dupleix took

Madras by the agency of Admiral Labourdonnais and a fleet from the Isle of France (Mauritius). He held his conquest and was defending Pondicherry against a British expedition when the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle put an end to the war. Madras was restored to the British, much to Dupleix's disgust (1748). In the following year Dupleix found means of re-opening the struggle



L'ORIENT, the home port of the French East India Company, 18th century
(From Bankes, *System of Geography*, c. 1795)

in pursuit of a policy of his own, not dictated by his superiors at home. He espoused the cause of a native claimant to the throne of the Carnatic, trusting that in the event of success his client would be a mere vassal of the French. He also sent a subordinate, the Marquis de Bussy, to carry out a similar scheme in the inland province of the Deccan; and the prospect unfolded of building up, province by province and with a minimum of expenditure, a French Empire of India. 'The British Company' servants took up the challenge in the Carnatic, although not in

the Deccan, and the military genius of Robert Clive foiled the schemes of Dupleix by the defence of Arcot (1751) and the relief of Trichinopoly (1752). These proceedings having taken place during a time of ostensible peace, and being unauthorized by the French directors, Dupleix was recalled in disgrace in 1754, and the contest for India was suspended for two years.

It broke out again in a different quarter in 1756. Just as the Seven Years' War was beginning in Europe the Nawab of Bengal



GORÉE, a famous 18th-century slaving post
(From Corry's *Windward Coast of Africa*, 1807)

took the British factory of Calcutta and massacred his prisoners in the Black Hole. Clive led a punitive force from Madras, dethroned the Nawab by the victory of Plassey (1757), and set up a puppet prince in Bengal much as Dupleix had sought to do in the Carnatic. He also captured the French factory of Chandernagore on the Ganges. Meanwhile a new French expedition was approaching the Carnatic under the Comte de Lally. After some preliminary successes Lally was decisively beaten in the field and obliged to surrender Pondicherry in 1761. The French hold upon the Deccan also collapsed, whilst the British took Masulipatam and the Northern Circars in 1759. The Treaty of Paris (1763)

restored the French factories, but left the British masters of two provinces with the further potentiality of building up that empire of which Dupleix had dreamed. The fate of India was in fact determined.

In the Atlantic arena the colonial struggle followed the same general course—a half-hearted war ending at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, a period of unofficial fighting between colonists, and the decisive Seven Years' War of 1756–63. In the first of these periods the British took Louisbourg, which they restored in exchange for Madras in 1748. The unauthorized fighting centred round a contest for the Ohio valley, claimed equally by the French from Canada and by British pioneers crossing the Alleghanies from Virginia and Pennsylvania. It was the key to the whole future domination of the West, and the French at first made good their hold upon it by the defeat of General Braddock near Fort Duquesne in 1755. The Seven Years' War opened with British failures, chiefly due to the incompetence of the government. Then in 1757 William Pitt took control, viewing the great Atlantic arena as a whole and making the Mediterranean and the contemporary German campaigns accessory to his handling of the chief problem. His plan was simple in outline but intricate in detail. He used the navy to blockade the enemy fleets in their European ports, kept French armies busy in Europe by subsidizing Frederick of Prussia, and meanwhile used the greater part of the British army in colonial expeditions. Thus he completely conquered Canada in the three successive campaigns of 1758–60, the decisive victory being the capture of Quebec by Wolfe in 1759. With Canada fell Fort Duquesne (now Pittsburg) and the Ohio valley. In the West Indies he took Martinique and Guadeloupe, and in West Africa Goree and the Senegal, the bases of the French slave trade. Spain joined France in 1761–2 just as Pitt was driven from power by a domestic intrigue. But Pitt's system remained in operation. Spain lost Florida, Havana in Cuba, and Manila in the Philippines of the Far East. At the Treaty of Paris Great Britain restored

Havana and Manila, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Goree, the French fishery in Newfoundland, and the factories in India ; but she retained her other conquests, which yielded the prospect of dominating the whole continent of North America as well as the sub-continent of India. Her gains among the hitherto unallotted islands of the Caribbean were also considerable. The three centuries' competition for the mastery of the Atlantic seemed to have ended in favour of the British Empire.

(ii) *The Independence of the United States*

The great conquests of the Seven Years' War necessitated a reorganization of the British Empire. In India this was postponed with deplorable, although not irremediable, results. In America it was undertaken forthwith in such a manner as to lead to a catastrophe. Viewed in a long perspective it provides an illustration of a common fault of statesmen, the neglect to acknowledge the facts which history has to offer them, or still worse the patronage (as in the late German Empire) of a false and sycophantic interpretation of history. Sir Robert Walpole, like Dr. Johnson, had a keen scent for humbug ; hence their common sneers at the flag-waving patriotism of their day. Yet no one now accuses them of failing in patriotism of the true sort. They saw what the English public failed to see, that whilst in men like Pitt imperialism was a sentiment pure and undefiled, it was for the mercantile interest a calculated begetter of profits. The colonists, both in America and the West Indies, were keenly and even morbidly conscious of this element in the conduct of imperial affairs. It produced a background of irritation and suspicion before which a few unintelligent measures appeared in a worse light than their designers had imagined to be possible.

The facts of history neglected by the statesmen of the early years of George III were these ; the colonists had always enjoyed a large share of local self-government, including the control of their internal taxation ; the Navigation Acts, fanatically main-

tained in theory, had been very slackly enforced in practice for a full forty years before the Seven Years' War, and the evasion of some of their provisions had become an established custom in American seaports; during that period American population had increased enormously, and the colonists had preserved the purity of their parliamentary institutions whilst those of the Mother Country had become scandalously corrupt; and finally, the French military power in North America had been a menace tending to promote imperial unity, a menace which was now removed. To act in defiance of these facts was to water the seeds of a quarrel which could only give rise to ideas of separation. Those ideas were scarcely mentioned in 1763 and certainly not widely entertained. But they were destined to flourish with extraordinary rapidity in the years to follow.

The imperial reorganization proposed by George Grenville in 1763-5 was directed towards securing an efficient system of defence and a development of inter-imperial trade by which to recover some of the wealth expended in the war. He proposed to distribute military garrisons throughout the colonies and to maintain the navy at a strength sufficient to keep open the imperial communications. He conceived that the greater part of the expense would fall upon the home population, but he determined that the colonists should contribute in two ways, first by the extension of the scope and the rigid enforcement of the Navigation Acts, and secondly by the imposition of a direct internal tax by means of stamped documents. Both measures were defensible according to the economic and political canons of the time; both were unwise in the light of the facts outlined above. It was difficult for the colonists to raise a good case against the Navigation Acts, since their legal validity had been uncontested for a century. All the feelings of anger and suspicion therefore converged upon the Stamp Act, and to the cry of 'No taxation without representation!' it was swept into limbo without ever having come into operation in the American colonies. The quarrel once started

renewed itself by every fresh ministerial blunder and every corresponding agitation on the part of the colonial demagogues. There followed in the next ten years Townshend's American



Import Duties, the retention of that on tea when the others were repealed, the burning of the *Gaspee* revenue cruiser, non-importation of British goods, the Tea Act of 1773 and its complement the Boston Tea Riot, the Intolerable Acts of 1774, and the outbreak of rebellion in New England in the following year. On July 4, 1776,

delegates from twelve of the thirteen colonies, attending a Congress at Philadelphia, voted the Declaration of Independence.

The first three years of the war, from Bunker Hill to Saratoga (1775-7), demonstrated that Canada had no mind to join the revolt, and that George III's armies under capable management had a chance of stamping it out. But the management was not capable, and there were interested onlookers. The Duc de Choiseul, chief minister of France until 1770, had foreseen the whole trend of affairs, and had worked hard to reorganize his shattered navy in order that France might one day seize her advantage. Choiseul dreamed of a disruption of the British Empire by which the American colonies should become an independent state and France should obtain the mastery of the West Indies, to her of much greater value than the lost province of Canada. Choiseul did not live to see the day of action, but his successors inherited the idea. They decided to strike when news came to France of the surrender of a British Army at Saratoga, a defeat which from the military point of view was not so irretrievable as its political consequences were to make it. Early in 1778 France signed an alliance with the United States, unwittingly signing also the death-warrant of much else—of her own *ancien régime*, and of the European system of colonial expansion hitherto prevailing. Spain joined the alliance in 1779, Holland in 1780, whilst the minor sea powers banded themselves into the Armed Neutrality to resist the restriction of neutral commerce by the British Navy.

Britain was thus committed to a war with the armed forces of the civilized world. She had no ally, and she found no genius like Pitt to lead her. She had forgotten even Pitt's strategy, and the blockade of the European ports which had left the colonial field at his mercy. French and Spanish fleets ranged the Channel, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, threatening invasion, besieging Gibraltar, capturing Minorca. In 1781 Admiral de Grasse conveyed French forces from the West Indies to join

other Frenchmen and Washington's Americans in destroying a British Army for the second time at Yorktown on Chesapeake Bay. De Grasse then turned to the conquest of the British West Indies, which were only saved by Rodney's timely victory of The Saints in 1782. The Treaty of Versailles in 1783 confirmed the independence of the United States and the loss by Great Britain of Minorca, Florida, and some minor units. Even so, the resistance of the outmatched British people, corruptly governed and badly led, had exceeded anything which might reasonably have been expected. It was a testimony to the solid wealth and strength derivable from the old imperialism. Our modern conversion to free trade should not tempt us to overlook what results the old economy and the spirit which informed it actually produced.

(iii) *The Independence of Latin America*

Allusion has already been made to the economic reaction of colonization upon European life; and the political reaction flowing from the independence of the United States was no less far-reaching in its effects. Frenchmen had fought for, and the French Crown had allied itself with, a movement in which subjects protested against misgovernment by revolutionary means. Revolution had triumphed, and had organized the nearest approach to a democratic state on a great scale which the world had yet seen. In doing so it had put into practice the theories of a host of idealists of the eighteenth century amongst whom Frenchmen had been the most prominent; the framers of the American constitution of 1787 had often the phrases of Montesquieu upon their lips. The example could not be lost upon France, and the occasion for its application followed directly from the war itself; for the Bourbon government in achieving its revenge against England had dealt the last blow to its own finances, so that within five years of the Treaty of Versailles it had staggered into acknowledged bankruptcy and consented to the summoning of the States-General, the opening move of the French Revolution.

Spain had declared against England in 1779 with a certain reluctance. She desired revenge for her colonial and Mediterranean losses, but she was conscious that she was setting a bad example to her own colonists by countenancing a colonial revolt. The presentiment was correct, for the example bore fruit in due course.

The impulse of the revolt of Latin America came, however, only indirectly from the United States. More immediately it sprang from the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars between the European governments. The success of the Revolution filled the world with questionings of the validity of that absolute authority which had always been the keystone of the Spanish system. The Spanish Navy, the effective link between Spain and her Empire, was destroyed at Trafalgar. Three years later, in 1808, Napoleon deposed the Spanish Bourbons and proclaimed his brother Joseph king. At once a revolt began of the Spanish people, unorganized and fitful in intensity, yet persistent and under democratic leadership. The Spanish colonists, looking on, saw the ancient tie of sovereignty dissolved and their compatriots at home struggling of their own initiative for freedom, a spectacle never before witnessed since the Spanish Empire had been founded.

The Spanish officials in the colonies, hampered by their traditional loyalty to the fount of authority, hesitated to disavow Joseph Bonaparte. The people, on the other hand, were in no doubt from the outset that their duty was revolt against the French usurper. The movement which ended in independence began therefore as a legitimist support of the deposed Bourbon, Ferdinand VII. But it was complicated by the fact that the real anti-French authority in Spain lay not in the exiled king but in the popularly appointed *juntas* which co-operated with Wellington's armies. The result in South America was a medley of local movements and counter-movements all really stimulating to the new idea of local self-government. By 1814, when Ferdinand VII was restored to absolute power at home, he found that Peru was prepared to obey him whilst the River Plate colonies to the south-

ward and those of the Spanish Main to the northward had passed beyond the stage of acquiescence in any external rule, and were proclaiming themselves independent republics. A powerful contributory impulse to this result was that during the Napoleonic interlude the ports of Spanish America had been thrown open to British and American trade, and that the reassertion of the Bourbon power would entail a return to the old system of shackled commerce.

In 1815 Ferdinand VII undertook reconquest. He dispatched General Morillo to the Spanish Main with 10,000 regular troops, and Morillo in two years extinguished the republics of Venezuela and New Granada, organized by the liberator Bolívar. Bolívar fled overseas to return and fight another day. There followed two movements spread over several years and converging upon the Royalist centre of Peru. San Martín from the unsubdued Argentine Republic crossed the Andes and liberated Chile, aided by the British Admiral Cochrane who had been unjustly dismissed from his own country's service, and who organized a naval force which defeated the remnants of the Spanish Navy upon the Pacific coast. San Martín had completed his work in Chile and taken Lima, the capital of Peru, by 1821. Then, with a Royalist reaction in Peru, his movement came to an end. Meanwhile, Bolívar had returned to the Main in 1817, enlisting British veterans of the Peninsula to fight against the Spanish regulars. With their aid he had finally liberated the northern coast by 1821, and was ready to take up the work which San Martín was relinquishing in Peru. Intricate campaigns and desperate fighting occupied four years, until the decisive battle of Ayacucho in 1824 led a year later to the striking of the last Spanish flag in South America. Bolívar dreamed of a federated United States of South America, but local jealousies and geographical facts were against him; and in the years which followed his victories the map of the continent took the political shape which we know to-day.

In Mexico a parallel course of events took place—confused quasi-revolutionary movements during the Napoleonic period,

a Royalist reaction after 1814, and a final revolution, not seriously resisted by Spain, in 1821-3.

The separation of Brazil from Portugal was somewhat differently accomplished. In 1807, on the invasion of Portugal by Napoleon, the government fled to Brazil, from which it administered the Portuguese Empire until 1821. In that year it returned to Lisbon, and Brazil became discontented at the loss of her position as the predominant partner. In 1822 she declared herself an independent empire under a member of the Portuguese royal family, an arrangement which subsisted until 1889, when she became a federal republic.

On the continent of Europe the absolutist Holy Alliance of the sovereigns who had crushed Napoleon viewed the emancipation of Spanish America with disfavour. In 1823 the Holy Alliance deputed France to exterminate a new liberal movement in Spain itself, and when that had been accomplished the project arose of French intervention to recover in some way the lost European influence in South America. The interests of Britain and the United States were touched; and the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine coupled with Canning's recognition of the new republics (1823-5) put an end to the scheme.

7

*Modern Expansion : the Americas and the
British Dominions*

THE events described in the last chapter—the colonial wars, the Napoleonic wars and the achievement of independence by the greater part of the two Americas—prepared the ground for that great migration of surplus population from Europe which has so profoundly and permanently altered the aspect of the world during the past century. The fate of the old colonial empires of Great Britain and Spain established the principle

that colonies, once they have attained a certain degree of stability and power of self-defence, will no longer consent to remain *possessions* of the Mother Country, dependent upon her policy in matters of trade and finance, and enjoying political liberties definitely inferior to hers. On the contrary, they develop a national consciousness of their own which insists on being satisfied by full self-government and membership in a common association upon terms of equality. Non-recognition of these principles broke the tie between Britain and the thirteen states ; recognition of them has preserved the new British Empire constructed since that separation. But whether the colonies have separated or held to the associations of their birth, they have all served as receptacles for the overflow of Europe, which has found its level in accordance with the habitable capacity of every temperate region of the earth's surface not already occupied by natives of its own in too advanced a state of organization to be turned out.

The United States has been the chief goal of this migration, whilst two South American republics, the Argentine and Brazil, have received a smaller, though appreciable, share. The other settlement-regions have been the great dominions under the British flag—Canada, ceded by France in 1763 ; Australia, annexed by Captain Phillip in 1788 ; South Africa, yielded by the Dutch in 1806 ; and New Zealand, annexed in 1840—all dating their active development, and all but one their acquisition, from the time subsequent to the fall of the old colonial empire. The most valuable heritage bequeathed to Great Britain by that old empire was the sea power which enabled the new one to be built up and the best sites remaining in the world to be secured for it.

The Industrial Revolution, the substitution of machines and mass-production in factories for hand-work under domestic conditions, began in England shortly after the middle of the eighteenth century. As has been suggested, the time of its occurrence was largely determined by the rapid growth of the colonial and Asiatic markets for manufactures, and by the accumulation

of capital already made by the successful venturers in those fields. The scientific inventions which are to a superficial view the causes of this great change are much more accurately classified among its results, for they were such as might quite well have been made at any time during the previous century had the demand for them existed. After Great Britain the next country to be affected (although on a small scale) was the United States, where the profits of neutral trading during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars accumulated capital, and the cessation of trade during the war with Britain in 1812-14 stimulated a demand for home manufactures. Not until after the fall of Napoleon and the establishment of a permanent peace by the Vienna Congress did the new industrialism spread into the continent of Europe. There it took root in the first half of the nineteenth century in France (to a limited extent), Belgium, and Western Germany; extending in the second half into Italy, the rest of Germany and Austria, and even making a beginning in the illiterate Russian Empire. Still later the process has crossed the frontiers of race and attacked Asia, Japan being now well advanced in industrialism whilst India is recognizably in course of transformation.

Everywhere the Industrial Revolution has been accompanied by a great increase of population. Scientific progress has reduced death-rates, whilst birth-rates have not fallen in proportion. Agriculture has improved its methods in unison with industry, so that the soil of Europe now produces far more food-stuffs than in the past. Mechanical transport has rendered practicable the shifting of grain and meat for thousands of miles at a cost negligible when compared with the market price. Population therefore has grown, and at such a rate as commonly to exceed the limits prescribed by comfort and employment. Europe has produced, for the first time in her history, a surplus of human beings willing to seek, in large masses, new homes in other continents; and this surplus has appeared just when improved transport has provided an easy means of conveyance, and employment has existed overseas in

the raising of food-stuffs and raw materials for the European market. Since the opening of the nineteenth century it is computed that more than 40 million persons have emigrated from Europe by sea. The part in the process played by cheapened transport may be illustrated by the fact that in 1620 it cost the Pilgrim Fathers £10 each in the money of their day to convey themselves across the Atlantic, whilst shortly before the Great War of 1914 a steerage passage could be had for £5, or less than one-tenth in real value of money.

In this sketch we have to consider the United States in the character of a great settlement-colony, admitting all European nations indiscriminately and moulding them into citizens of a democratic English-speaking community exhibiting all the many-sided life of a modern state—industry, agriculture, commerce, and transport—mingled in due proportion. The country has been fortunate in securing in advance suitable territories for the expansion of its population, and we may turn first to the successive acquisitions which have made the map of the United States what we know it to-day.

The thirteen colonies acknowledged independent in 1783 lay between the Atlantic seaboard and the ridge of the Alleghany Mountains. Maine,¹ the northernmost, was bounded by Nova Scotia and the St. Lawrence valley; Georgia, the southernmost, by the Spanish territory of Florida. The original United States, therefore, nowhere touched the shore of the Gulf of Mexico. The peace treaty recognized their right of expansion as far westward as the Mississippi, and decided in their favour a point of enormous importance to their future, the ownership of the lands in the great angle between the Ohio and the Mississippi, bounded on the north by the great lakes. This tract had been the prime cause of the Seven Years' War between Britain and France. It had been

¹ Maine was an apanage of Massachusetts, although geographically separated from it. Thus it did not by itself rank as one of the original states of 1783.

won together with Canada by the victories of that contest, and it had been definitely annexed to Canada by the Quebec Act of 1774. In 1782-3 the British negotiators at Versailles yielded it to the United States. The generation following independence saw the penetration of this region, and of that to the south of the Ohio, by migrants from the original colonies. By 1820 the new states of Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Mississippi, Illinois, and Alabama had been peopled and admitted to the federal union as the first instalment of the march to the West. New England also completed itself by the formation of Vermont in 1791 and by raising the rank of Maine from a territory to a state in 1820. By the same date the population of the whole country, estimated at about 3,000,000 in 1783, had risen to 9,600,000. This expansion was chiefly due to the natural increase of a hardy people with an ample area of cheap land to exploit. The great influx from Europe had not begun, the total number of immigrants from 1783 to 1820 being only a quarter of a million.

Whilst the boundaries of 1783 were being filled an option was being secured upon a further great tract. Louisiana, at the mouth of the Mississippi, had been a small French colony until 1763. France then ceded it to Spain, and Spain returned it to France in 1800. In 1803 Napoleon, finding it a useless possession whilst British fleets barred access by the ocean, sold it to the United States for 15 million dollars. The little population centring round New Orleans became the state of Louisiana in 1812, but this was the least important part of the bargain. The boundaries of the whole purchase were undefined but, on a minimum interpretation, immense. From the river mouth they marched north-westwards with the equally vague frontiers of Mexico to the Rocky Mountains, and thence northwards until they touched upon the claims of the Hudson's Bay Company in what are now the prairie provinces of Canada. This northern frontier, from the Lakes to the Rockies, was settled by a treaty in 1818 to follow the parallel of 49° N. Another purchase followed in 1819, when

Spain bartered away her right to Florida, so completing the American occupation of the northern shore of the Gulf of Mexico.

The occupation of the Pacific coast began before that of the prairies between the Mississippi and the Rocky Mountains. Before the close of the eighteenth century British and American pioneers were trading and exploring in the region known as Oregon between the Pacific and the Rockies, and between 42° N. and 54° N. Some reached it by land across the continent, more by sea round



Cape Horn. Either side had a good claim to the country, and a partition was obviously the fair solution of the problem. It was nevertheless postponed for half a century and only effected in 1846 when friction had become acute and a war was seriously threatened. The Oregon Treaty continued the frontier westwards from the Rocky Mountains to the ocean along the parallel of 49° N., and gave to Britain the whole of Vancouver Island, stretching a little to the south of that limit.

Meanwhile, a war with Mexico was adding another enormous area to the United States. The original republic of Mexico,

formed by the severance from Spain, covered a much larger area than it does to-day. Its claim indeed carried it up the Pacific coast to the borders of Oregon, and along the Gulf of Mexico until it marched with Louisiana. One of its constituent states, Texas, had always had a government semi-independent from that of the rest. This local autonomy was infringed by the Mexican dictator Santa Anna, and in 1836 the people of Texas, many being American immigrants, declared themselves an independent state. So they remained until 1845 when they applied for and obtained admission to the American union. Mexico at once declared war, and in 1846-8 saw her armies defeated and her capital occupied by American forces. In the latter year she signed a peace by which she gave up not only Texas but also the present states of California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado (part), Arizona, and New Mexico. This, with the comparatively small Gadsden Purchase from Mexico of 1853, completed the outline of the United States as we know it. Alaska, separated by Canadian territory in the far North, was purchased from Russia in 1867.

No sooner had the treaty with Mexico been signed than a rush of population set in to California by reason of the discovery of gold there at the close of 1848. California already contained a number of American residents, and these were augmented by troops who would not remain with the colours and sailors who would not stay by their ships, so overmastering was the lure of gold. The transcontinental routes were not yet thoroughly opened, and the bulk of the new inhabitants of California arrived by sea from the Atlantic ports. By 1850 the region was sufficiently organized to be made a state, the first of the Mexican conquests to attain that dignity. The last, New Mexico and Arizona, were admitted in 1910.

The first undertaking of the founders of the Republic in the eighteenth century, after the achievement of independence, had been to devise a constitution. In 1787-8 they adopted one of the federal form, each state retaining control of certain of its

internal affairs, and yielding to the National Government its powers in matters of common concern. The National Government consists of the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the President ; the State Governments, of two Houses and a Governor. These and many other offices are elective, and usually held for short terms of from one year upwards. The life of the American citizen is therefore a whirl of elections, but the result is secured that the public can, if it chooses, assert its theoretical sovereignty. The corresponding disadvantage is seen in the prominence of the professional politician, the man who makes his living, not by service in office, but by the marshalling and manipulation of his party's forces.

The next great event in American history after the completion of the external frontiers was the Civil War of 1861-5. It arose from many causes, some being attributable to the stresses set up by the rapid expansion of previous years. As a humourist put it, ' It began with Texas and ended with taxes '. Amongst the causes may be mentioned the shifting of the balance of wealth and authority away from the conservative South to the progressive North and West ; the old economic quarrel between the free-trade South and the protectionist North ; the more obvious and spectacular quarrel over the retention or abolition of slavery ; and conflicting interpretations of the constitution, emphasizing respectively state rights (South) and national rights (North). The election as President in 1860 of the abolitionist Abraham Lincoln gave the signal for the eleven southern states grouped about the Atlantic coast and the Gulf of Mexico to secede from the union and set up an independent government as the Confederate States. The war was for their reconquest by the Federal Government. The Confederates, outmatched in everything but valour and generalship, were crushed by the spring of 1865, after a contest which had cost a million lives ; and the Federal Union was permanently re-established.

Until the time of the Civil War, and perhaps for some twenty

years after it, the great majority of Americans were of British and Irish descent. It is true that there had been a German immigration into Pennsylvania in the eighteenth century, and a very considerable German settlement in the middle West dating from about 1850; but the general result was as stated. From 1840 immigration rapidly increased. In the decade ending in 1850, 1,700,000 persons arrived; for 1870 the corresponding figures were 2,300,000; for 1890, 5,200,000; and for 1910, 7,760,000. For many years after 1845 Irish immigrants were predominant; from the Civil War to about 1890 the majority were probably Germans; after 1890 for a few years Italians were the most prominent; and finally, the huge immigration of the twentieth century has been principally of Slavs and other eastern Europeans. To-day the United States, although speaking the English tongue, and having institutions based upon English law and custom, numbers among her citizens less than 50 per cent. of men of British descent. This is worth remembering by those who are inclined to talk without due reservation of the ties of blood binding Britain and America. The 110 millions of America are in fact a separate national type, the fruit of a general European migration, and but little more closely affiliated to the British than to the German or Slavonic nations. Amongst their constituent elements should be mentioned about twelve million negroes, descendants of the four millions liberated by Lincoln in the Civil War.

Tropical Central and South America have not been greatly affected by the European exodus. Climate has been generally a deterrent, and the governments of the states founded in the decade 1820 to 1830, whilst democratic in form, have been corrupt and tyrannical in effect. There was at first a disposition in Europe to hope for great progress in the new republics. They raised large state loans without difficulty, and industrial investors risked large sums in undertaking to develop them. The result within a few years was bankruptcy, repudiation, and a general loss of capital. The shadow thus cast has never wholly lifted, and tropical America

remains largely unexploited to this day, its population consisting of the Latin, Indian, and half-breed elements of colonial times, not reinforced by any invigorating strain from modern Europe.

Temperate South America has been more progressive. Chile and the Argentine Republic have developed more vigorous populations and more respectable governments than those of their northern neighbours ; and the Argentine in particular has received a considerable body of immigrants from southern Europe. Its first census, taken in 1869, showed a population of about two millions, and by 1895 this had risen to nearly four millions. The present total is estimated at nearly nine millions. A fair proportion of the increase has been due to immigration, principally of Italians and Spaniards. From 1857 to 1920 over five million immigrants arrived in the country, but a certain number of these were Italian labourers who came only for the harvest and returned to their own land for the remainder of the year. The great economic development of the country has arisen from the production of food-stuffs—grain and meat—for the European market. Southern Brazil has likewise proved attractive to European settlers, of whom over three and a half millions are estimated to have entered between 1820 and 1920. Of these about one-half have been Italians and one-fifth Germans.

The four great dominions of the British Empire—Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand—occupy between them all the remaining regions of the world which are suitable for European habitation and contain no native populations of sufficient strength to repel intruders. An exception to this statement might perhaps be pointed to in Siberia ; but its attractiveness is comparatively low, and the history of recent years leaves still undecided the question whether its more valuable portions are ultimately to be retained by Europeans or by Asiatics. The British dominions, therefore, claim chief attention in completing this review of the overflow of European population.

A detailed history of each of these units is not permissible within

the scope of this account, but there are certain common features in their development which together illustrate the play of the forces with which we are dealing. Regarding that development in retrospect from the present day we may divide it roughly into three main periods—overlapping and not sharply defined—but each exhibiting central characteristics peculiar to itself. The first, comprising about half a century from the close of the American War of Independence in 1783, is that of the obstinate survival of the policies of the old colonial system and their final extinction by the new world-conditions whose implications were only gradually recognized. The second, occupying the remainder of the nineteenth century, is the great formative period of large emigration, improved communications, and the growth of colonial liberty into an independence which has not involved separation. The third, from the South African War to the present time, is marked by the general recognition of the fact that the colonies have become nations, and by the resulting concession to them, in principle, of equality of status in the common association of British peoples which is now somewhat incorrectly named the British Empire.

The first of these periods has been less studied by historians than any other in the record of British expansion, and it is necessary to speak with some caution even of its leading characteristics. To it belong the origins of British settlement in Canada, and the acquisition of Australia and the Cape of Good Hope. At the signing of the treaties of 1783 the only regions outside the West Indies peopled with British settlers and remaining under the British flag were Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, each very sparsely occupied. Canada consisted of the single province of Quebec, a narrow strip along the banks of the St. Lawrence inhabited almost exclusively by Frenchmen. The Hudson's Bay Company and its rival the North-West Fur Company claimed all the North and West, excluding settlers and allowing none but their own servants to penetrate. British expansion in Canada flowed from the action of the United States. The victorious republicans

inflicted harsh treatment upon the loyalists who had stood by the British connexion, and these to the number of about 40,000 emigrated into British territory to the northward. The United Empire Loyalists, as they were officially styled, greatly strengthened Nova Scotia, formed in 1784 the new maritime province of



AUSTRALASIA as mapped before Cook's discoveries
(From *The Gentleman's Magazine*, 1763)

New Brunswick, and also settled the new inland province of Ontario or Upper Canada. Upon the nucleus thus formed immigrants from the British Isles, especially after the peace of 1815, built up a substantial British population. At the same time the French of Quebec increased and multiplied, although receiving no more recruits from their mother country. Conservative and Catholic in their attachments, they looked with disgust upon the doings of the French Revolution.

Australia was discovered by the Dutch of the seventeenth century, if not by the Portuguese of the sixteenth. No explorer, however, examined its attractive south-eastern coast until 1770, when Captain Cook sailed thither from New Zealand. Cook named the country New South Wales, and his scientific passenger, Sir Joseph Banks, became an ardent advocate of its colonization. At this time the implications of the Industrial Revolution and of the growth of English population were as yet unnoticed by statesmen, amongst whom there appears to have been no prescience of the great future awaiting *colonies de peuplement*. After 1783 the preference was rather for tropical dependencies and the trade attending them, especially in the Indian Ocean. This, indirectly, may have led the younger Pitt (Prime Minister from 1783) to take an interest in Australia; for the prestige of the French Navy had never at any time been higher, and French explorers were busy in the Pacific. Unless forestalled, it seemed likely that they would acquire stations which might prove detrimental to British interests in the East. A more immediate problem also demanded solution, that of the disposal of British criminals, hitherto transported to the American colonies. Accordingly in 1787 Captain Arthur Phillip received instructions to plant a convict settlement in New South Wales and to annex all the eastern half of Australia. He founded Sydney early in the following year. Shortly after his arrival a French officer, La Pérouse, appeared upon the coast; if he intended annexation, as seems possible, he was just six days too late. For over thirty years New South Wales and its daughter-colony Tasmania (1803) remained primarily convict settlements, although gradually a class of free colonists sprang up, recruited from time-expired prisoners and retired government servants of the colony. Free emigration was at first scanty and discouraged, and not until towards 1840 did the arrivals of free settlers exceed those of the convicts. During the same period explorers opened up the interior, the annexation of the whole continent followed, and small beginnings were made of the non-convict colonies of

Western Australia (1829), and South Australia (1836). Their history, however, and that of Victoria and Queensland, partitioned from New South Wales, belongs rather to the second of our periods.

Cape Town, with its surrounding agricultural district and the prospect of extension over all South Africa, was a British conquest of the Napoleonic wars, when Holland and her colonies suffered as parts of the French Empire. Here again there was no idea of a future white dominion, and the British government retained the Cape in 1814 solely for its strategic importance on the road to India. The presence of its 26,000 Dutch inhabitants was accepted as a liability rather than an asset. British officials, missionaries, and settlers reached the colony in a thin stream, and in 1820 a new all-British settlement was founded at Grahamstown, farther to the East, based upon Algoa Bay. In the succeeding years also a few daring adventurers seated themselves on the coast of Natal, among the ferocious Zulus.

The administration of this embryo empire was for a generation more autocratic and reactionary than that of the old North American colonies, although this was as much due to circumstance as to the inclination of statesmen. The French peasants of Quebec and the Boers of Cape Colony, alike illiterate and untrained in politics, were unfit for self-government, whilst the criminals of New South Wales were considered to be amenable only to the sternest military despotism. Such was the doctrine of the time, although social historians are now making it apparent that large numbers were transported for offences involving little moral stigma, and it is open to doubt whether, in the main, the character of the convicts dictated the system or the system was responsible for the character. The gradual infiltration into all the colonies of a politically more responsible type of settler produced stresses which tested the ability of imperial statesmanship. The problem first arose in Canada. There the Loyalists of Ontario, accustomed in their former homes to political liberty and having a claim to the gratitude of Britain, asked for representative institutions. These

were granted by Pitt in 1791 and at the same time extended for the sake of uniformity to the French of Quebec. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick already possessed elected assemblies. The effect of the French Revolution was to make the conduct of British statesmen illiberal and autocratic, a tendency which was reflected in colonial administration. Until 1823 the personal authority of the governor of New South Wales was unlimited. In that year provision was made for a council of nominated members to deliberate with him, but not until 1842 did any measure of representative government come into force. Similarly in Cape Colony the governor was unchecked until 1825, when a nominated council was instituted. Elections were held for municipal councils from 1836, but a representative assembly for the whole colony was only established in 1853.

It was in the choice of its officials more than in its principles that the colonial administration incurred censure. All the governors of this period were military or naval officers, whose training often rendered them unsympathetic towards the civilian ideal of the conduct of affairs by discussion. They were usually men of high character but, in the case of the North American provinces, were sometimes absent from their posts for years at a time, performing their duties by deputy. The subordinate officials were generally of a lower type, disliking and disliked by the genuine colonist, greedy of power and influence, sometimes dishonest, and commonly contriving to form themselves into a barrier between a well-intentioned governor and his subjects. Representative assemblies had little control over these officials, since their appointment lay with the imperial authorities. Where, as in Quebec and at the Cape, the inhabitants were of a different nationality from their rulers, the sense of grievance attaching to this system was accentuated.

The old fiscal and commercial organization of the empire, designed for the plantation colonies of the seventeenth century, continued to operate under the new conditions. Until 1822-5

the Navigation Acts remained in full force, restricting the whole trade of the colonists to British shipping. At the same time, of course, colonial produce enjoyed a preference against that of foreigners in passing through the British custom houses. In the years above named Huskisson and other statesmen removed many restrictions, but the Acts were not totally repealed until 1849. In the decade 1842-52 Great Britain abandoned the policy of protective duties and adopted that of free trade, a change which swept away the colonial preference already indicated, and swept away also much of the occasion for a strict control of colonial affairs.

In the years following 1830 it became apparent that the existing system of colonial management was breaking down. Emigration was on the increase, and with it an interest in the colonies revived at home. Canada, torn by racial dissensions and the constant grievance against maladministration, broke into rebellion in 1837. In South Africa the Boers and many of the British hated the missionaries, who exercised an immense influence upon the public at home, and so upon the Colonial Office. The exultation of the missionaries at the emancipation of the Hottentot slaves in 1833-4, the defrauding of their owners of most of the compensation due to them, and the reversal by the colonial secretary of an annexation of native territory made by the governor in 1835, all mortified the Boer. He felt that his character was unjustly blackened, and he decided to move off out of the ken of official and missionary alike. In 1836 began the Great Trek, which led to the formation of the Boer republics and to the deepening of the racial conflict which has cursed South Africa ever since. Even in New South Wales, most strictly ruled of all the colonies, the free settlers were showing dissatisfaction. Their demand was for the stoppage of transportation, which was granted in 1840 and followed by representative government two years later. The event which, more than any other, marks the end of the old period, is the Canadian rebellion. It was easily put down, and the reformers at home dispatched the Earl of Durham, a liberal-minded peer, to

investigate its causes. His *Report*, written in 1838, heralded a new age not only for Canada but for the empire at large; for he advocated responsible government, the responsibility of administrative officials to the elected representatives of the people, as the true remedy for the ills of the time. Within a few years this system was adopted in Canada, and verified the predictions of its author; thence it spread to the other colonies as in turn they became ripe for it.

From about 1840 to the close of the nineteenth century—or, by a coincidence, the reign of Queen Victoria—is the period in which the colonies shaped themselves into dominions. Its determining influences were improved transport, increased emigration, democratic politics, responsible government, free trade, and peace. Upon the effects of steam power as applied to ocean transit it is scarcely necessary to dilate. What is often forgotten is that improvements in construction, navigation, and food preservation rendered the sailing-ship of 1850 at least 100 per cent. swifter, safer, and more comfortable on long voyages than her predecessor of the eighteenth century, and that the incomparable clippers of the mid-Victorian era bridged the gap between Britain and the southern colonies until the steamer was ready to come into its own. The growing stream of emigration, therefore, found the means at hand to conduct it. Until 1840 it had gone almost wholly to Canada and the United States. After that date a fair proportion of it sought South Africa, and still more Australia and New Zealand. The great days of South Africa began in the 'seventies and 'eighties, culminating in the last decade of the century. Australia felt the influx earlier. The abolition of transportation, the growing home demand for wool, and the discovery of gold in 1851 all increased its attractions, so that by 1859 the continent comprised six separate and self-supporting colonies. In 1840 the imperial government, again spurred by the rumour of French designs, consented to the annexation of New Zealand, already containing about 2,000 unauthorized white

settlers. This youngest dominion, in spite of early troubles with its warlike Maori tribes, prospered with remarkable speed and uniformity, offering to the small capitalist farmer and the agricultural labourer better prospects than either enjoyed at home. Canada also reached out to the West, the beginning, as with the United States, being made upon the Pacific coast—British Columbia was organized in 1858—and the occupation of the intermediate prairie provinces being afterwards completed.

Responsible government, that is real self-government in all internal affairs, greatly eased the strains of expansion. The colonial governor ceased to be an autocrat and became instead a referee between parties, trusted because he had no personal end to serve other than the pride of worthily fulfilling his task. In Canada responsible government was fully developed by 1848. It was introduced in Australia in 1855, in New Zealand in 1856, and at the Cape in 1872. In all these new countries the absence of any definite lines of class distinction made a democratic franchise inevitable, and contemporaneously the Mother Country was moving in the same direction. The divergence of political tendency which had done much to estrange England and America in the eighteenth century was thus eliminated. Political responsibility and the growing sense of nationhood produced another result, the tendency for small units to merge into larger ones. The Canadian provinces federated into the Dominion in 1867, for reasons essentially similar to those of the United States eighty years before. Long years of discussion in Australia issued in the same end by the proclamation of the Commonwealth in 1901. South Africa, less happily circumstanced, had to unify herself by war, and the political expression of the result was delayed until 1910.

The abandonment by Great Britain of the doctrines of trade regulation so tenaciously held in the eighteenth century was probably a condition without which all else would have been unavailing to weld the new empire together. It made colonial liberty a reality, it removed causes of suspicion and the play of

sordid motive, and by lessening the number of petty occasions for the display of the central power it saved the latter from much criticism and increased the fund of instinctive loyalty at its disposal in a crisis. In short, whereas material interests, real or imaginary, had been the true bond of empire in the eighteenth century, moral sentiments produced the common patriotism of the nineteenth. And after the events of recent years the most sceptical critic cannot afford to sneer at them.

The latest of our periods begins with the South African War of 1899-1902. The new dominions put armies of their own into the field small but efficient, and covering themselves with credit. After the contest the imperial government recognized the fact of dominion nationality. South Africa was to be neither British nor Dutch, but South African. The early concession to the Transvaal and Orange Free State of the responsible government enjoyed by the Cape and Natal led to the general fusion on equal terms of 1910. By that act the best men of either race showed their intention to bury the past and work for a common future. In the other dominions national consciousness was a growing force in the interval between 1902 and 1914. It produced dominion armies and even embryo dominion fleets. The Imperial Conference, the periodical meeting of the senior statesmen of the empire, helped to co-ordinate this strength and maintain unity in diversity. So, to the surprise of Germans, who had ridiculed it as a pasteboard edifice which would collapse at the first kick, the empire moved united through the Great War, all its citizens acting on one impulse towards one end at least as effectively as those of the disciplined German state. But it emerged, now plain to the eye as what it had long been in essence, a league of equal nations inherently loyal to one another by the force of common origin and tradition. The formal recognition of the individual nationhood lies in the separate dominion signatures to the peace treaty; that of the unity of the league, in the common allegiance to the King.

We have now sketched the political structure which occupies

the settlement regions of the British Empire. It remains to indicate the extent to which they have been peopled. In 1783, when the American states had just parted company, the total white population remaining in colonies under the British flag cannot have exceeded a quarter of a million; to-day it is in the neighbourhood of seventeen millions, more than one-third that of the British Isles. The largest dominion population is also the oldest, that of Canada; in 1825 it amounted to 581,000; in 1851, 1,842,000; in 1880, 4,324,000; and in 1921, 8,700,000. Next comes Australia. In 1815 it had about 25,000 people; in 1840, about 200,000; in 1881, 2,300,000; and in 1921, 5,436,000. New Zealand had by 1881, forty years after its first settlement, a white population of 489,000; in 1921 it had 1,218,000. South Africa at the time of the Great Trek in 1836 had a mixed British and Boer population of about 55,000. In 1875 Cape Colony and Natal had together about 280,000 white inhabitants, and the Transvaal and Orange Free State about 130,000. In 1921 united South Africa possessed 1,521,000 white men living among some 5,000,000 Kaffirs. These populations are in the main the result of British emigration and the multiplication of the earlier generations of colonists. In Canada the French stock, although increasing, is now inferior in numbers to the British. Western Canada has in recent years attracted a considerable body of American farmers, many of them of British descent. It has also been affected, but much less than the United States, by the Slavonic emigration of the twentieth century. Its climate, however, does not prove congenial to the southern European. The Australians and New Zealanders are almost exclusively of British descent, nor does there appear to be any sign at present of an influx of other nationalities. In South Africa the British and Boers are thought to be about equal in numbers, although the census makes no discrimination between them. Germans and other nationalities are present, but in inconsiderable numbers. Taking the dominion populations together it is a fair estimate to place the proportion of British origin at nearly four-fifths of the whole.

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*Modern Expansion : the Dependencies
of Europe*

WHILST the European dominions have grown in the modern period from settlements into nations, the small and precarious European holdings upon the coasts of Africa and Asia have during the same time become great dependencies, ruled throughout by European officers and effectively penetrated for hundreds of miles from the sea. The secret of this penetration has lain, on the moral plane, in the European passion for orderly and decent government, and on the material, in the improvement of transport, the deadliness of modern fire-arms, and the scientific victory over tropical hardships and diseases. Like the peopling of the settlement regions, it is in the main an effect of the Industrial Revolution ; but it has been achieved rather by the machines than by the man-power which that change has added to Europe's strength. Here it should be premised that the terms Europe and European as used henceforward include America and American, for all the Americans who really influence the world's fortunes are of European stock.

A comparison of the political map of the world of 1783 with that of to-day will reveal the geographical extent of the change. In West Africa at the former date there were only trading and slaving stations upon the coastline, occupied by the British, French, Dutch, and Portuguese, but—with the shadowy and doubtful exception of Angola—involving no jurisdiction over the natives at large or any appreciable area of their territory. The interior, even behind the Guinea Coast, where the European forts were most numerous, was almost unexplored, so that not even the courses of the greater rivers were approximately determined. In East Africa the influence of Europe was yet more scanty, for the Portuguese hold upon its harbours, once extending well up to

the Equator, had shrunk to the neighbourhood of the Mozambique Channel before the aggression of Arab venturers from the Persian Gulf. North Africa, from the Straits to the delta of the Nile, was still entirely barred to Christendom, the Moslem conquest which had wrenched it from the Roman Empire never yet having been reversed. In Southern Asia a European beginning had been made. The British East India Company ruled the province of Bengal, and influenced the government of the Carnatic and the region round Bombay. But it did not by any means rule India, for the Mahrattas of the centre were militant and unbeaten, and the Moslem powers of the north-west had not yet been seriously challenged. Elsewhere on the mainland there were no European holdings save Malacca, owned by the Dutch, but the latter still held the south-eastern Archipelago which they had seized in their prime, whilst Spain held the Philippine Islands secured to her by Magellan in 1521. Intercourse with Japan, save that provided by a single Dutch factory, was forbidden; that with China was precarious and limited to the port of Canton. Persia, Burma, Siam, and Indo-China were independent kingdoms, apparently powerful and able to resist penetration. In the north Russian officers ruled the almost deserted regions of Siberia, but they had not yet stretched southward to the populous lands of Turkestan, lying between the Caspian Sea and the Chinese Empire.

To-day the aspect is very different. The whole of Africa, except the inland kingdom of Abyssinia and the small republic of Liberia, has been partitioned between European powers, and, what is more, is effectively governed by them; although Egypt is now set on her feet as a semi-independent state. The Turkish Empire of the Near East has collapsed, and its outlying regions are being reconstructed as civilized states under European tutelage. Persia has become an anarchy ripe for European control. British India now stretches up to its natural mountain frontiers on the north and north-west. Burma is a British dependency, whilst Cambodia, Cochin China, Annam, and Tongking are French. The Malay

Peninsula is a group of British protectorates. Holland maintains, except for Ceylon, her ancient possessions, now much diminished in relative importance by the change in mercantile values; and the United States have supplanted Spain in the Philippines. Siam alone of the south Asian kingdoms retains an untroubled independence, and that not by virtue of its own power of resistance. Of the stronger Asiatic nations, Japan has completely adopted western methods and made herself a great power; whilst China, politically disorganized, is unconquerable by reason of her bulk and her millions of orderly inhabitants, with their age-long tradition of obedience to their own local leaders and their latent patriotism ready to blaze up against foreign intrusion. But everywhere in independent Asia, notably in Japan, perceptibly in China, European culture is in the ascendant and native culture in decline. To that extent Europe is there a conquering force.

The West Indies in this world-change present a curious spectacle. There no native race exists, but there are two intruding races, the African and the European, the one introduced in slavery by the other. In 1783 the European was supreme and African subjection complete. Now the negro enjoys economic and some slight political liberty, and in one island, Hayti, he governs or misgoverns himself. In the others the administration is in European hands, but the population, except in Cuba, is predominantly negro in blood. The European, by an act of altruism, has in fact made a present of much of the inheritance to his former slaves, who would doubtless have become self-governing ere now had they shown the necessary political capacity.

Turning to the steps by which Africa has come within the orbit of European influence, we find that the first undoubtedly was the abolition of the slave-trade and slavery by all the European powers. This took place in several stages, from the British Act of 1807 to the final emancipation of negroes in Brazil in 1888. In the main, slave-trading in West Africa was at end well before 1850. In East Africa slave-hunting for domestic purposes by the Asiatics of

By this means they can fill the Plantations with *Blacks* and have Stock enough to furnish the *Spaniards*, which at this time make Overtures to them, and to shew what a Trade it might be, take the following Account.

The *Spaniards* treated with the *Royal African Company of England* for 5000 whole Pieces of *India* the Year for 7 Years to be delivered at some of the Islands.

But to make this good, the Company were to ship from *Africa* 7 or 8000 Pieces, out of which the *Spaniards* were to chuse 5000 whole Pieces, and the Company to dispose of the rest.

A whole Piece of *India* was according to the Ages of the *Negroes*, Male or Female. Those between 15 and 45 or 35, were a whole Piece; between 4 and 8, were 2 for 1; between 8 and 15, or above 45 or 35, were 3 for 2, and those under 4, were cast in with the Mother.

Now considering the Allowances, there were to be ship'd from *Africa* yearly about 10000 Persons in 7 Years 70000.

The *Spaniards* not being in good Credit, negotiated this by *Augustino Lomelino* and other *Genoeses* Bankers at *Middl*, in and about 1664, and transferr'd it to *Sigmor Ferri* at *Amsterdam*; But the *Dutch War* in 1665 broke all off.

This I have from a Gentleman who had the Perusal of a Book of the Letters and Negotiations of the Treaty.

Such a Trade as this made by an Act of Parliament for 99 Years certain, wou'd much improve all our Western Plantations. and by degrees perhaps find as good Mines in *Carolina* as in *Potosi*; 'twou'd encrease Seamen and Ships of Strength for our Use at home, and encourage Growth and Manufactures here great, 'twill bring us in Gold apace to make *Guineas* with, and the Goods from the Plantations will fetch us in Silver, besides the Silver is gotten for the *Blacks*: And this is what I verily believe might have been already done, had not our Misunderstandings hinder'd in; and I do think I shall never meet with the Man that can and will fairly gainsay it. But perhaps this is not best for us: For if *Jessurun* thou'd wax fat, he wou'd kick his Maker: Therefore God thinks fit to let us be divided, which will keep us poor, and perhaps more humble.

'PIECES OF INDIA'. A light on the slave trade

(A leading article in Houghton's *Collection*, 1696)

the coast continued much later, but in its bulk the traffic never approached that of the Europeans on the west coast. The abolition of the slave-trade rendered the interior much more accessible to explorers. It also turned the attention of merchants to the natural products of the country just at the time when the machines and factories of Europe were demanding ever-increasing quantities of raw materials from every quarter of the globe. Not long after the first blow at slaving had begun the opening of West Africa, another stroke in the north opened a gate in that quarter. In 1816 British naval forces chastised the Barbary pirates, hitherto the pests of the Mediterranean, and in 1830 a French expeditionary force landed in Algeria and began the conquest of that country, a conquest which has increased to the occupation of the greater part of the north-west of the continent. 'I desire the French to restore Roman Africa,' wrote their commander-in-chief in 1838; and in their modern colonization the French have consciously adopted some of the Roman methods.

The conquest of Algeria, only two days' steaming from the shores of France, was the first instalment of the partition of the continent. For a long while it remained the only one. The preliminary processes—exploration, the tranquillizing influence of the missionaries, and the revelation of valuable products—all occupied a long period; and it is only within the memory of the present generation that the greater part of the work has been done. In North Africa France added Tunis to her dominions in 1881, and Morocco in 1911-12. Italy also in 1911-12 went to war with the Turkish Empire and conquered the provinces of Tripoli and Cyrenaica. The story of Egypt is more intricate. Early in the nineteenth century its ruling Pashas rendered themselves independent, in all but the form, of their Turkish suzerain, and a hereditary line of Khedives was set up. The Suez route to India drew Europeans to the country, English and French in fairly equal strength. The Suez Canal, a French undertaking, was opened in 1869. At the same time the Khedive Ismail, by his extravagant pose of a great

sovereign and his dreams of an empire extending south to the equator, involved the country in bankruptcy. The European creditors stepped in, procured his deposition in 1879, and sought to reduce the chaotic finances to order. The attempt involved European political control. In reaction came the nationalist revolt of Arabi Pasha. France declined to take her share in its suppression, and left the task to Britain alone. So began in 1882 the British regeneration of Egypt, a process steadily pursued amidst foreign jealousy and native ingratitude to its issue at the present day in the inauguration of an autonomous native government.

So much for North Africa which is ethnically and politically a limb of Asia. The real Africa is in those respects a huge island, and lies south of the Sahara. On its western coast when the slave-trade ceased the British held a number of stations, the most northerly being the mouth of the Gambia River. Next to the southward came Sierra Leone, originally acquired in 1787 by a philanthropic society as a home for liberated slaves, but afterwards taken over by the Crown. Then eastwards along the Gold Coast lay British forts interspersed with others belonging to the Dutch and the Danes. The chief French base in West Africa was the estuary of the Senegal River. The French extended their power inland with great energy, encircling the British possessions, and coming down upon the coastline between them. The Gambia and Sierra Leone thus reached the somewhat restricted limits of their expansion in the decade between 1880 and 1890. The Gold Coast was not so closely encircled. There the British bought out the Danes and the Dutch in 1850 and 1871 respectively, and conquered the inland kingdom of Ashanti in the following period. Farther east the sovereignty of Lagos was peacefully acquired from its native chief in 1861. About 1880 the trade of the Niger delta and the Bight of Benin was recognized to be of great value. An English company was formed in 1882 to exploit it, and was reorganized as the chartered Royal Niger Company in 1886. The Company had previously made agreements with the

native chiefs of the river, and these secured recognition at the Berlin Conference of 1884-5. This was an international meeting to regulate what is called 'the scramble for Africa'. It allotted to Germany the Benin region named the Cameroons, and Togoland adjoining the British Gold Coast; to France an extension of the older Gaboon settlement, which became the French Congo; and to Britain the protectorate of the lower Niger, which has since become the great dependency of Nigeria. West Africa north of the Congo was thus completely parcelled out.¹

The discoveries of Stanley and Livingstone had revealed the value of the great Congo basin. The Berlin Conference decreed that this immense region should be internationalized and governed for the common good of Europeans and its own natives. Shortly afterwards the international association formed for this purpose announced that the territory was to be known as the Congo Free State and that its sovereign was to be Leopold, King of the Belgians. This was simply a pluralism on the part of King Leopold, and did not ostensibly involve any political connexion between Belgium and the Congo. Belgians, however, were the most numerous among the European officials employed in the state, and in 1890 Belgium secured a political hold upon it by advancing a loan. The full transference to Belgian sovereignty took place in 1908. Prior to this there had been horrible revelations of cruelties practised upon the wretched natives in order to extract from them supplies of rubber; it was reasonably proved that the Free State officials had instigated or connived at wholesale massacre, torture, and even cannibalism on the part of their black troops. Since the Belgian government has assumed responsibility there appears to have been an improvement.

The year 1884 marks the entry of Germany into another part of the continent, South-West Africa, lying between the Portuguese Angola and the British Cape Colony. Germany found

¹ Considerations of space have compelled the omission of reference to certain minor West African units.

On the east side of Africa the scramble proceeded simultaneously and with no less energy. The coastal districts on the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean grouped around the inland state

of Abyssinia had nominally formed part of the Egyptian possessions under the Khedive Ismail. The bankruptcy of Ismail and the revolt of the Sudan under the Mahdi left these claims derelict, and European powers stepped in to share the spoil. In this way Italy had by 1888 built up her province of Eritrea on the Red Sea, whilst France in 1883-4 took the adjoining district of Obock. In 1884-6 Britain occupied for strategical reasons that part of the Somali coast which faces towards Aden, and Italy took the far larger Italian Somaliland to the southward. An ambitious Italian scheme to annex Abyssinia and so link up Somaliland with Eritrea was stopped by the crushing defeat of Adowa at the hands of the Abyssinians in 1896.

South of Somaliland the coast down to the ancient Portuguese possession of Mozambique was under the jurisdiction of the Sultans of Zanzibar, who also possessed trading (in practice slave-trading) rights over an undefined area of the interior. British missionaries, following the lead of Livingstone, penetrated this country, and in the 'eighties British traders became active there. In 1885 the colonizing party in Germany determined to create an interest in East Africa, and their emissaries obtained concessions right and left from the native chiefs. Both Britain and Germany formed chartered East African companies, that of the former receiving its patent in 1888. The Berlin Conference did not deal with the scramble for this side of Africa, since the questions involved were hardly ripe in 1884-5. They were settled by an Anglo-German treaty in 1890 and an Anglo-Portuguese treaty in 1891. The former divided the coastline and the interior up to the line of great lakes into British East Africa (now Kenya Colony) and German East Africa (now Tanganyika Territory). The British East Africa Company was forced by circumstances shortly afterwards to extend its hold to Uganda. Its financial resources proved inadequate, and Uganda became a protectorate of the British Crown in 1894, whilst the Company surrendered its charter for the original colony in 1895. The treaty with

Portugal settled questions arising out of the work of British missionaries round Lake Nyasa and out of the operations of the chartered British South Africa Company in opening up Rhodesia. These activities involved some differences with Portugal, since the inland boundaries of Mozambique were quite undefined and much of the country had never actually been occupied. The settlement of 1891 resulted in the creation and delimitation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and the Nyasaland Protectorate. France obtained no territory in East Africa below the Red Sea, but during its partition she revived her ancient claims to Madagascar, and effected a conquest of that island.

The war of 1914-19 involved the extinction of all German rights in Africa. By the treaties of Versailles the League of Nations was nominally given the disposal of the German colonies, and it allotted mandates for Tanganyika to Great Britain, for South-West Africa to the union of South Africa, and for the Cameroons and Togoland to Britain and France, the share received by France being the larger.

The status of one more African area—the Egyptian Sudan—needs explanation. Originally ruled by the Khedives, it was lost to the Mahdi, a religious rebel, in 1885, reconquered by the British and Egyptian armies in 1896-8, and thenceforward treated as a joint Anglo-Egyptian dependency. The granting of independence to Egypt is not, apparently, to affect the position of the Sudan, although the present arrangement is already proving inconvenient.

Of the European dependencies in Asia, Siberia is the greatest in area, and India the most wealthy and populous. Russian Asia, extending eastwards to the Pacific, and southwards through Turkestan to the borders of Afghanistan and Persia, shared with European Russia the bureaucratic administration of the Tsars until the war of 1914. The subsequent revolution has disorganized the whole empire, and leaves the present position of its dependencies obscure and the future of some of them doubtful. Siberia

was penetrated and sparsely occupied during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The more important southern advance in the direction of India took place in the last third of the nineteenth century, when the powers of western Europe were partitioning Africa.

The creation of British India was, as a matter of conquest, effected in the century between 1757 and 1857. Since the latter date extension has been small, and the improvement of administration and political conditions has furnished the main field of activity. The full story must be sought in works devoted to the history of the British Empire; here a summary of outstanding steps can alone be given. First it should be noted that the alien British rule in India is the successor of another alien rule, that of the Mogul emperors, Mohammedan conquerors who crossed the north-western mountains in the sixteenth century. The Mogul Empire maintained order throughout the greater part of India until 1707, when it collapsed with the death of Aurangzeb. Thereupon its subject-princes, the Mohammedan nawabs and the Hindu rajahs, sought to become independent sovereigns; there was much assassination, civil war, and overturning of thrones; and the Mahratta warrior chiefs of the centre, coupled with new Afghan invaders in the north-west, rapidly reduced the whole land to chaos. The European trading companies were thus obliged in self-defence to think of administering the regions lying nearest to their factories. Before they could do so effectively they had to decide the supremacy between themselves, a duel from which the English emerged victorious at the close of the Seven Years' War in 1763.

Already Clive's conquest of Bengal in 1757 had given its first considerable dominion to the English Company. The task of government was new to the Company's servants, and their tradition of unselfish devotion was yet undeveloped. The administration of Bengal was therefore clumsily and unjustly carried on during its early years, but with the accession of Warren Hastings to the governorship in 1772 there was a real improvement.

C A R G O E of Dutch East-India Ships.

2855924 <i>lb</i> Pepper	1740 <i>lb</i> . Gallinall.	1200 <i>ps</i> . Betillees d'Ornael.
33553 <i>lb</i> . ditto white.	136 <i>lb</i> . Birds-Nests.	500 <i>ps</i> . Betillees Allejae.
322417 <i>lb</i> Nutmegs.	50 Canasters Tea.	853 <i>ps</i> . Betillees Camman.
105528 <i>lb</i> . Mace.	11550 <i>lb</i> . Coffee.	2624 <i>ps</i> . Mulmuls.
8000 <i>lb</i> . Cinnamon.	423 <i>lb</i> . Cowries.	2777 <i>ps</i> . Coffees.
8301 <i>lb</i> . Seed Cloves.	250 <i>lb</i> . Sugar.	696 <i>ps</i> . Doras.
1653000 <i>lb</i> . Saltpetre.	33984 Canes of one Joint.	266 <i>ps</i> . Terindains.
364133 <i>lb</i> . Sapanwood.	1400 Bamboo Canes.	3031 <i>ps</i> . Humhums.
3945 <i>lb</i> . Ebony of Amboina.	70879 <i>ps</i> Several sorts of China Ware	200 <i>ps</i> . Cuttobances.
14710 <i>lb</i> . ditto of Ceylon.	78047 <i>lb</i> . Bengal Silk.	822 <i>ps</i> . Alibances.
256250 <i>lb</i> Copper of Japan in Staves	11838 <i>lb</i> Floretta Yarn.	9440 <i>ps</i> . and 1 Pack Parcallaes.
199845 <i>lb</i> . Tin.	12903 <i>lb</i> . Cotton Yarn.	3600 <i>ps</i> . Gurrahs.
55316 <i>lb</i> . Green Ginger.	6697 <i>lb</i> . Armenia Wool.	2000 <i>ps</i> . Cambays
10020 preserved Nutmegs.	11132 <i>ps</i> . Taffias.	525 <i>ps</i> . Milmils.
13 Pots preserved Cloves.	747 <i>ps</i> . Silk Allejaes.	110 <i>ps</i> . Bedticking.
1092 <i>lb</i> Oyl of Nutmegs in Cakes.	119 <i>ps</i> . Bengal Silks.	2000 <i>ps</i> Patena Chints.
14161 <i>lb</i> . Cardamom.	300 <i>ps</i> . Atlafies.	8578 <i>ps</i> . Romals.
27660 <i>lb</i> . Benjamin.	980 <i>ps</i> . Soosies.	5193 <i>ps</i> . Caetjaes of several sorts.
65 Bezoar Stones.	13172 <i>ps</i> . Neckcloths.	20320 <i>ps</i> . Photos.
4200 Reals black Ambergris.	293 <i>ps</i> . painted Chairs of the Coa.	792 <i>ps</i> . Gingham.
132 <i>lb</i> . Sanguis Draconis.	6845 <i>ps</i> . painted Handkerchiefs.	4000 <i>ps</i> Dungarees.
362 <i>lb</i> . Borax	5498 <i>ps</i> . Morees.	3200 <i>ps</i> . and 3 Packs Baffs.
5393 <i>lb</i> . Radix China.	21800 <i>ps</i> . and 15 packs Salampores.	21770 <i>ps</i> . and 61 Packs Long Cloth.
	700 <i>ps</i> . Betillees Sestergantine.	4962 <i>ps</i> Sail Cloth.
	900 <i>ps</i> . Betillees Orizael or R	25.

AN EAST INDIAN LADING, 1696. From Houghton's *Collection for Improvement of Husbandry and Trade*.

Friday August 3, 1699.

The defeat of the French had left the British in a position to control the actions of the Nawab of the Carnatic. They neglected to use their power until 1801, when the Marquis Wellesley, Governor-General under Pitt's India Act, annexed the province owing to the Nawab's misgovernment. Wellesley's rule (1798-1805) was the first great period of British expansion in India. In addition to the Carnatic he annexed Tanjore, Orissa, the Delhi region, and parts of Mysore and Oudh; and enforced a strict protectorate over other large regions in Central India. He was the first British ruler to challenge and defeat the Mahrattas, although their power was not finally broken until 1818. After the lapse of a generation the policy of annexation was resumed. In 1843 the Company's troops conquered Sind after a brief campaign, and in 1849 Lord Dalhousie proclaimed the annexation of the Punjab after two hard-fought wars with the Sikh armies. Dalhousie peacefully annexed certain minor regions on the failure of heirs to the native ruling families. Finally, in 1856, he dethroned the last King of Oudh for persistent misgovernment, and the Company took over the territory.

Dalhousie's annexations, coupled with the introduction of railways and telegraphs and some unsympathetic handling of the native troops, led to the great sepoy Mutiny of 1857-8. The revolt, chiefly military but to a certain extent national, was only put down after hard fighting, principally at the relief of Lucknow, the capital of Oudh, and the capture of Delhi, the mutineers' head-quarters. The authority of the Company was abolished and that of the Crown proclaimed in 1858. Since that date there have been no further annexations in India proper, although the native princes have been supervised in the administration of their provinces.

On the frontiers there were wars with Afghanistan in 1839-42 and in 1879-80, chiefly caused by the desire to counteract Russian influence in that country. The Afghans successfully resisted British domination, but Baluchistan, commanding the southern passes over the mountains, became a protectorate. On the east

the great kingdom of Burma was annexed in three stages, 1823-6, 1851-2, and 1885-6, each of the wars being provoked by the obstinate and unneighbourly conduct of the Burmese kings.


Besides British India, Burma, and the Malay States there is one other important European dependency upon the mainland of southern Asia—the series of French colonies and protectorates known collectively as Indo-China. In area about equal to Burma at its fullest extent, and inhabited by an oriental people with an established though arrested civilization, these ancient kingdoms escaped European domination until the latter half of the nineteenth century. French adventurers first visited Annam in 1787 and obtained the cession of an island for use as a trading station. Fifty years afterwards French missionaries became active, penetrated the country, and suffered persecution. In retaliation a punitive expedition captured Saigon in 1858-9, and maintained a war upon the King of Annam until in 1862 he was obliged to cede about half of Cochin-China, the southernmost part of his dominions. In 1867 France annexed the remainder of Cochin-China. She had already established a protectorate over the adjoining kingdom of Cambodia, and in 1873 she took occasion to intervene in the affairs of Tongking, a vassal-state of Annam lying to the northward. Prolonged campaigns resulted in 1884 in the reduction of both Annam and Tongking to the status of French protectorates. At this time an extraordinary hunger for expansion at any cost and on any excuse affected all the sea-going nations of Europe, and the French officials in Annam and Tongking showed that in their minds a protectorate was but a step towards annexation. In consequence the old dynasty and its people revolted and the whole country was subject to a guerilla warfare from 1887 to 1891. In that year a new governor-general inaugurated a new policy. By disclaiming all desire for annexation, and reverting to a sincerely worked protectorate, he was able to restore order and prosperity. The contiguity of Burma and Tongking should be noted. The final British conquest of the former in

1885-6 was partly due to the French advance in Tongking and the fear lest a hostile Burmese sovereign might open a gate of invasion into India from the east. Siam, by maintaining a correct attitude as a buffer-state, has preserved her independence.

Although China and Japan have never become European dependencies the effects of European ideas upon them are sufficiently important to need a brief explanation. With China trade in the early nineteenth century was conducted only at Canton, where it was divided principally between the British and the Americans, the British share being monopolized until 1834 by the East India Company. The throwing open of the trade in that year led to disorders, accentuated by the objection of the Chinese Government to the opium brought from India in exchange for tea. A seizure of opium at Canton in 1839 caused a war with Great Britain, ending in 1842 with the cession of Hong-Kong by the Chinese, and the promise of unfettered trade and the opening of five additional ports. The United States and France hastened to secure similar commercial facilities. The Chinese of this period deserve sympathy in their forlorn attempt to maintain their ancient position as the head nation of the Far East; their supremacy was moral rather than material, and their empire was based rather upon order and industry than upon force. Their mistake was that they could not bring themselves to treat Europeans as equals. They despised them, and they did not fear them so much as with greater wisdom they might have done. This attitude tempted them to further commercial disputes, maltreatment of missionaries, and humiliating slights upon the diplomatic representatives of the powers. In 1857-60 a new war broke out. French and British troops took the Taku forts, Tientsin and finally Peking, and enforced the reception and respectful treatment of permanent legations at the capital.

European intercourse with China was now fully open, and the empire, its ancient prestige irreparably damaged, subsided into a period of uneasy peace. It was, however, a peace of decay and

not of recuperation. In the last decade of the nineteenth century the European powers, having disposed of Africa and made large acquisitions elsewhere, began to contemplate the partition of China, an event which was reckoned in the late 'nineties to be imminent. Russia began the construction of the trans-Siberian railway, with plans for a branch to strike southwards through the Chinese province of Manchuria. In 1894-5 Japan, now equipped



Two famous tea clippers, the *Ariel* and the *Taeping*
Illustrated London News, 1866

with a westernized army and fleet, picked a quarrel over the affairs of Korea, another vassal-kingdom of the empire. The Japanese were quickly victorious on land and sea, and stormed the strong fortress of Port Arthur, the key of southern Manchuria. A combination of Russia, France, and Germany compelled them to withdraw from their conquest, and two years later Russia took possession of Port Arthur and completed her railway through Manchuria. Germany in compensation secured a lease of Kiao-chow as a naval base, and Britain of Wei-hai-wei. The Boxer rising, a manifestation of the anti-foreign feeling aroused by these

events, broke out in 1899-1900. It was suppressed by a force of British, French, Germans, Russians, and Japanese, who marched to Peking, relieved the beleaguered legations, and looted the city.

But the time was past when China could be partitioned at a conference table as Africa had been. Britain and America were against the project, the mutual jealousies of the powers were now too great, and a stalemate ensued broken only by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. Japan fought to evict Russia from Manchuria and to prevent her intended seizure of Korea; and an unbroken series of victories enabled the Japanese to step into Russia's place in both those provinces. There the disruption of China by foreign hands has ended, but her internal decay has moved apace. Doctrinaire reformers educated in Europe have substituted a nominal republic for the imperial throne, but the country still labours in an anarchy of which the issue is unrevealed. Perhaps a foreign seizure of some province in the heart of the empire might have done good by arousing public spirit and crystallizing the dissipated energy of the race.

Upon the Japanese, a people more united and practical, western pressure has had a different effect. Until 1638 the country was open to European trade, and the Portuguese, Dutch, and English had in turn established themselves. Then the shogun, the mayor of the palace who ruled in the name of a secluded emperor, decided to break off relations with the outer world. The European merchants were expelled, with the exception of a small group of Dutchmen, and the Japanese themselves were forbidden to travel abroad or even to build sea-going ships. This radical policy justified its authors by enduring for over two hundred years. But by the middle of the nineteenth century the European peopling of the North American Pacific coast involved an intrusion upon Japanese privacy; there were plans to open steamship lines, and coaling stations were necessary. It is characteristic of the industrial age that such a reason for so serious a step would have been deemed adequate even had no others existed. In 1853 Commodore Perry,

with a squadron of United States warships, demanded the opening of Japanese ports. Next year the Japanese acceded, and at once British and Russian envoys came to secure similar privileges. In 1858 Japan signed general treaties with all the powers for open ports and unfettered trade in all goods but opium, the introduction of which was forbidden. Years of confusion followed. One party was for a desperate resistance and the eviction of the foreigners; the other party saw the futility of the attempt and desired that Japan should redeem her freedom by adopting the science of the west. These progressives finally triumphed, and in the revolution of 1867-8 the shogunate was abolished and the emperor restored to the active headship of the state. The building up of a westernized army, fleet, and political institutions followed. The latter-day wars with China, Russia, and Germany have yielded oversea possessions, and to-day Japan is a great power with the third largest navy in the world.

The remaining dependencies of the European powers are, with few exceptions, to be found in the islands of the Pacific Ocean. These islands, inhabited for the most part by an intelligent native race capable if carefully treated of surviving contact with white civilization, attracted the European powers first by their merchandise and later on account of strategic considerations in an ocean rapidly becoming the chief arena of rivalry in the modern world. By the year 1914 they had been parcelled out as follows: French, the Society Islands (protectorate 1842, annexation 1880), the Marquesas and the Low Archipelago (recognized by convention of 1888), New Caledonia (annexed 1853), and the unimportant Wallis Islands; British, the Fiji Islands (annexed 1874), the Gilbert, Ellice, and southern Solomon Islands (annexed 1886), southern New Guinea (protectorate 1886, crown colony 1888, territory of Australian Commonwealth 1906), the Tonga group (1899), and numerous isolated units; joint French and British condominium, the New Hebrides (1887); German, northern New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the northern Solomon

Islands, and the Marianne, Marshall, and Caroline groups (all by agreement with Great Britain, 1886), Samoa (the two larger islands by partition with United States, 1899); United States, Sandwich Islands (gradually formed protectorate ending in annexation, 1898), Philippine Islands and Guam (conquest from Spain, 1898), Samoa (Tutuila Island, by partition with Germany, 1899).

In the war of 1914 Germany lost all her Pacific possessions; the Samoan Islands to New Zealand; New Guinea, the Bismarcks, and Solomons to Australia; and the Marshall, Caroline, and neighbouring small islands to Japan. The establishment of a British chartered company in North Borneo in 1881, of the British protectorate of Sarawak in 1888, and the gradual building up of the Federated Malay States around the British Straits Settlements, mark intrusions upon the ancient Dutch sphere of the Spice Islands archipelago. These have been peacefully accomplished since the regions named were not in recent times effectively occupied by the Dutch.

In the above review of the formation of European dependencies it will be noticed that the only great areas penetrated before the last third of the nineteenth century were Russian Asia, India, and Algeria. The first-named had a climate congenial to Russians and a scanty population incapable of effective resistance. Eastern, central, and southern India were, for tropical regions, comparatively healthy; they presented no great geographical obstacles; and their dense populations were an aid rather than a hindrance to penetration because they were politically impotent and, after the fall of the Mahrattas, incapable of organizing armies. North-western India was conquered by the wealth drawn from the remainder of the country, and partly by troops recruited from it. The process of European domination in India, as Dupleix had foreseen, extended automatically like a rolling snowball when once set in motion. The French in Algeria had before them a healthy climate and a hard-fighting though undisciplined people.



Their success was facilitated by the proximity of the country to France.

With these exceptions the great European dependencies date from the 'seventies and 'eighties, when the mechanical superiority of Europe was complete. The incentive lay in the ever-growing demand for raw materials, and the means in steam transport, arms of precision, and sanitary knowledge. The search for markets and for produce gave rise to a recrudescence of the mercantile imperialism of the old colonial period and a revival of the old method of expansion by means of chartered companies. The decade between 1880 and 1890 saw the formation of four British companies—the North Borneo, the Royal Niger, the British East Africa, and the British South Africa; of German companies for East Africa, New Guinea, and the smaller Pacific islands; and of a government for the Congo area which was essentially that of trading bodies to which the nominal administration delegated its powers. Of that terrible experiment a weighty authority remarks: 'If a text is needed either against Chartered companies, or against Governments taking part in trading concerns, it will be found in the story of the Congo.' The story of the other modern chartered companies is, with one or two exceptions, that of failure. The British and German East Africa Companies survived less than ten years, and were compelled by financial deficiencies to hand over their political responsibilities to their respective governments. The same consideration ended the rule of the German New Guinea Company in 1899. The Royal Niger Company found the task of administration outrunning its resources in 1900. The North Borneo and British South Africa Companies still survive. The former does not trade, but draws its revenues from the taxation of the territory it administers and the leasing of rights of exploitation to others. The latter has done a great work in 'developing' a derelict region, but in doing so it has created a white colony in Southern Rhodesia and has recently (1922) had to cede political control to the colonists themselves. The romance of distant

history, of East India, West Africa, and the old plantations, ought not to blind us to the fact that commercial imperialism, closely inspected, is a sordid business at the best ; and it is a good thing that in its undiluted form it is ceasing to prosper in the modern world.

The great nations which have dominated the non-European continents have done so each after a fashion of its own. In the British dependencies, on a general view of the period since 1783, we may say that the keynote has been a desire for justice and steady social progress, with methods suited to the particular needs of each locality. The British humanitarian movement of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries manifested itself first in the care of the dependencies, and has never yet lost its force. The trial of Warren Hastings for alleged misgovernment in India, the abolition of the slave-trade and slavery, and the inauguration of the great missionary societies marked the beginning of reform, and, broadly speaking, the spirit of these transactions has characterized British dealings with coloured men ever since, although it is always possible to point to exceptions. In the mechanism of administration the modern policy of the empire has been to train its dependents to govern themselves. In Nigeria and Ashanti, Uganda and the tropical African dependencies generally, the aim has been to preserve and reform the authority of tribal chieftains. In the Malay States the hereditary sovereigns have not been superseded but have been encouraged to rule by European methods. In India the beginning of a vast experiment in self-government is being cautiously made. There has been no attempt at general uniformity ; diversities of mechanism are as widespread as those of race, religion, and geographical circumstance.

France began her modern empire in North Africa, and she has never forgotten that she is there the inheritor of the ancient Roman *imperium* which once made the whole Mediterranean basin a civilized unit. She has conquered and made roads and recreated cities, and her own people have settled in numbers

sufficient to make Algeria a mixture of the *colonie de peuplement* and the *colonie d'exploitation*. She has undoubtedly succeeded, for the cut-and-dried logical type of her administration, with a formula for every appeal, is quite as congenial to the North African peoples as the more irregular method of the British in Egypt. Farther south the French Government is more military. There are two great units, French West Africa, which grew out of the Senegal and furnishes many regiments to the French Army; and French Equatorial Africa, which stretches northwards from the Congo and has absorbed the greater part of the German Cameroons. Each of these is subdivided into minor governorships. Although the French administration tends to be autocratic and is conducted on the spot, nearly all the French colonies (as distinguished from protectorates) have members to represent them in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies in Paris. Such representation has often been talked of but never adopted in the British Empire, where the alternative method of local parliaments has prevailed.

Germany came late into the colonial field. At the beginning of 1884 she had not a single overseas possession. Six years later her flag flew over four separate areas in Africa and many islands in the Pacific. Her colonization was the work of traders and a few enthusiasts rather than of a widespread national instinct. Bismarck at first frowned upon it, but its advocates convinced him against his will. They pointed to the waste of German youth by emigration to the Americas, and they tried to persuade themselves that the stream could be induced to flow to the arid wastes of Namaqualand or the torrid jungles of the Cameroons. In truth there was but one way for Germany to found a real colonial empire—by a successful war with Britain, France, or the United States, which, as the event showed, meant with all three. Meanwhile, in her African dependencies she ruled firmly and unsympathetically, never obtaining the liking of the natives, but in East Africa at least securing their respect. In her Pacific islands

her traders worked under chartered company organization, with which they were not markedly more successful than those who traded freely in the units under the British flag. And then, in 1914, after a thirty years' experiment, it all ended as rapidly as it had begun. There must be men living to-day who have been personal actors in every stage of German colonization from the first to the last.

Another late comer into the adventure of expansion is Italy. She also was losing emigrants to alien flags, and in the 'eighties decided that she must have a colonial empire. Forestalled by France in Tunis where she had real interests, she undertook to build up a great dependency in north-eastern Africa, where she had none. Her acceptance of the defeat in Abyssinia in 1896 showed the lack of a well-founded basis to her schemes. Her conquest of Tripoli from the Turk in 1912, followed so quickly by the general war, has scarcely yet had time to show whither it will lead.

9

To-day and the Future

THIS short concluding section will consist chiefly of the statement of questions to which at present there are no certain answers, but which must find their solution as the years unroll.

1. Is European expansion on the eve of a new period in its development? All history shows that no given state of human affairs is permanent, because the underlying conditions are always changing, slowly or rapidly, in their relative effect. The affairs of mankind do move in great 'periods', although these generally overlap, and can seldom be marked off by definite dates. The reasons for suggesting that one of these gradual changes from one period to another may now be taking place are as follows. The Industrial Revolution made Great Britain and certain other

European areas 'the workshop of the world'. They supported great populations by disposing of their manufactures, receiving in exchange other manufactures, raw materials, and food. Wherever an industrial population exceeds the food-producing capacity of its own soil it must depend for its life upon obtaining food from without in exchange for the produce of its industry. During the recent period in European history these manufacturing populations have been fed by the agriculture of Russia, the United States, the British dominions, and South America; whilst the 'coloured' regions of the world have supplied a great part of the raw materials. But in the last generation these food-producing and raw material-producing countries have begun to industrialize themselves, to develop their own manufactures with urban populations engaged in them, and to create a local balance between agriculture and industry which will render them less dependent upon trade with distant regions of the world. We see this process far advanced in the United States, and beginning in Canada, Australia, and India; and there is no reason why it should not go very much farther yet.

When this comes about what will be the position of the people of countries like Great Britain, unable to live by their own food-stuffs and raw materials? Will they not be driven to a colonization, much more rapid and intensified than ever before, of their home soil and of the great, thinly peopled dominions? This is not meant to suggest that trade and industry will suddenly lose their importance, but rather that they will share it with agricultural development, an interest which, great as it has been in the past century, would seem to be only at the beginning of its ultimate growth. The question, then, resolves itself into these terms: Are we at the opening of a period in which the concentrated population of Europe will seek to distribute itself more uniformly over all the habitable regions of the world, moving out over the oceans in masses such as have never moved before? And in considering it we should remember that transport facilities are, and will be,

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Regions settled by people of European stock
 " controlled " " " "
 " " " Non-Europeans



greater than they have ever been before ; and that the Industrial Revolution, the controlling set of factors, is not, as some textbooks would imply, a process that began in 1760 and ended in 1840, but one that is still actively moulding the world in which we live.

2. Is the present European hold upon certain regions imperilled ? This question has received more attention than has the former one, and it will be sufficient to indicate its chief elements. The practical title to the possession of any area of land is effective occupation. Australia and the Pacific islands, the west coast of Central and South America, East and South Africa, are all in the present possession of peoples of European stock ; but in parts they are very thinly occupied, and their more effective peopling is a process which seems to hang fire. At the same time Asiatic countries like India and Japan are experiencing an enormous growth of population, which is beginning to demand an outlet. Asiatics are tempted to think that the regions above-named are their natural settlement-areas, and to accuse Europeans of a dog-in-the-manger attitude of possession without exploitation. Australians have long been conscious of the Asiatic peril. They have federated themselves into a commonwealth, organized an army, and begun to build a fleet. They refuse admission to Asiatic settlers, and yet they themselves number less than six millions in a continent not very much smaller than Europe. It is a condition of political strain comparable to the strains in the earth's crust which give rise to volcanic explosions. In South Africa, particularly in Natal, there are already many Indian settlers. The ruling whites keep them in subjection and deny access to would-be later immigrants. In the Kenya Colony also Indians are well established and are demanding political equality. These African problems are further complicated by the virility of the negro and Kaffir races, who refuse to die out or retreat before the white man as the aborigines of Australia have done. Europeans, in Africa and Australia alike, live under the threat of a catastrophe.

3. Is European power on the wane in Asia? 'The answer now is almost certainly, yes. Until the close of the nineteenth century European dominance carried all before it. Englishmen tranquilly ruled India, and ruled it better than any conquerors had done before. Russians were consolidating their hold upon the region between the Caspian and the Chinese Empire, and upon Manchuria in the Far East. All the powers were nibbling at China and discussing its partition. Japan, the strongest Asiatic state, had been forced to relinquish her mainland conquest of 1895. It was a matter of prestige as much as of actual strength. The European had always beaten the Asiatic in war; that, to both sides, seemed an established law. Then, in 1896, the Abyssinians routed an Italian force at Adowa in an open battle which secured Abyssinian independence. North-east Africa is essentially Asiatic, and the news made a great stir throughout the east. Japan turned suddenly upon Russia in 1904, and beat her in every fight in a war of the first magnitude. Other Asiatic peoples saw that Japan had won by western methods. Persia and China made feeble efforts to westernize themselves by adopting European constitutions, with unhappy results. India began to agitate for political liberty, and to-day she has representative institutions with whose scope she is by no means satisfied. At the same time she is imitating Japan by adopting those industrial methods which lead to power. In Egypt, Syria, and Mesopotamia, the British are avowedly working to set up self-governing Asiatic states. The European who would stay permanently in Asia is confronted with a dilemma. Does he rule there for the benefit of less advanced peoples, and if so, ought he to coerce them when they are convinced that they can govern themselves? On the other hand, if he is in Asia for his own benefit, will it pay him to fight against a great Asiatic resistance, and will he be backed in so doing by the necessary moral support from home?

4. Are the Africans to remain for ever a subject race? There are in the United States about twelve million negroes, in the West Indies from two to three millions, and in the Union of

South Africa over five million Kaffirs of various Bantu tribes. These people have this in common, that they live in countries governed chiefly in the white man's interest, where they themselves have scarcely any political power, and at the same time they are in contact with civilization and are learning to ask themselves whether they must always and inevitably occupy an inferior position. It is this which differentiates them from the blacks of tropical Africa, where there are very few white men, no popular government, and therefore less sense of racial discrimination. The American negroes are a small minority in the whole population of the republic ; yet in the south-eastern quarter of it they form a greater proportion, and in one state they are in a clear majority. The constitution gives them equal political rights with white men, but in practice they are excluded from office and denied access to the polling-booths. Everywhere the whites, doubtless for very good reasons, segregate them—in conveyances, dwellings, and public institutions—and yet they are increasingly educating themselves, throwing up a professional class of their own, and tending to become a complete nation within a nation. And there is not, as in South America, any tendency for the white majority to assimilate them. White South Africa pursues a similar policy, and more perilously, for there the blacks are in the proportion of four to one. They are, however, not so advanced as the American negroes. All movements due to racial and national self-consciousness seem in modern times to grow more intense, and the African movement is certain to provide the future with a problem whose solution is not yet indicated.

5. Are the Americas destined to become the centre of the European world? North America is much more than twice the size of Europe, and offers much the same variety of climates and habitable areas. It is certainly not yet stocked with the maximum number of people it will support. The same may be said of the temperate parts of South America, whilst the tropical regions between are being made more healthy, and an exploitation of



AFRICAN TROOPS going into action in the Great War
(*Photo. by Lt. E. E. Wilson, M.C.*)

their resources is certain to ensue. The Pacific also is indicated as the great debatable ocean of the future, as the Atlantic was in the past. On one side of it lie the most progressive elements produced by the expansion of Europe, on the other the solid East, progressive also and promising to be more so, yet pursuing a very different ideal of development. The movement of Europe's population to the west, the assimilation there of its various nationalities, together with this strategic factor, may promise for the Americas the future headship of Christendom.

These and other unanswered questions show that the expansion of Europe is not a finished process, like some other historical themes. In a hundred years' time, even in fifty years, the story will appear very differently, and things that have already happened, and are now unnoticed, may take a significance which will change the proportions of the view of our present times. True history can only be written from a distance, as a true sketch of a countryside cannot be made from the centre of a thicket. And in thinking of contemporary events we need to guard ourselves most against the assumption, always subconsciously present, that our own generation is the end and triumph of the ages.

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
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